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WAIVERS OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
JONATHAN R. SIEGEL†

ABSTRACT
States normally enjoy immunity from suit by private parties, but
they may waive this immunity. The Supreme Court’s steady contraction of other exceptions to the rule of state sovereign immunity has renewed interest in the previously little-discussed possibilities of waiver.
This Article explores the boundaries of waiver doctrine.
This Article shows that, prior to 1945, the Supreme Court—even as
it enforced a broad, substantive rule of state sovereign immunity—applied a sensible doctrine of waiver that balanced the interests of states
with those of private parties and the federal judicial system. The
Court’s traditional doctrine treated state sovereign immunity like the
defense of personal jurisdiction. Failure to assert immunity in a timely
fashion waived the immunity defense. This rule prevented unfair
gamesmanship.
Beginning in 1945, the traditional rules concerning waiver of state
sovereign immunity got swept away by the overall ideological tide of
state sovereign immunity doctrine. The immunity became so important that it overrode all other considerations, including the need to run
the federal judicial system in a sensible way. The new rules of waiver
permitted states to abuse their immunity and waste federal judicial re-
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sources by litigating the merits of a case while holding an immunity
defense in reserve.
The Supreme Court’s most recent decisions suggest that the Court
has returned to its traditional rules concerning waiver. The Court
should make clear that it has fully reinstated the traditional, sensible,
non-ideologized rules of waiver. Such rules respect the states’ prerogative of refusing to be sued in a federal forum, while at the same
time requiring states to assert their prerogative in an orderly way that
respects the needs of the federal judicial system.
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INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years ago—perhaps even ten—hardly anyone would have
cared about waivers of state sovereign immunity from suits based on
1
federal law. Traditionally, waivers played only a small and subordinate role in the long saga of state sovereign immunity theory. The
sovereign immunity that the federal Constitution guarantees to the
states is a personal privilege that the states may waive at pleasure,2
but cases exploring such waivers have been rare. Far more attention
has been paid to other mechanisms by which private parties may sue
states.
The last decade has witnessed an abrupt change in this situation.
Suddenly, waivers of state sovereign immunity are an important issue.
3
Cases concerning waivers are cropping up all over the federal courts.
1. As this Article explains, courts and scholars have at times used the term “waiver” of
state sovereign immunity to describe three different things: action by Congress that eliminates
state sovereign immunity; a state’s voluntary, knowing relinquishment (usually in advance of
suit, and usually on a generic basis) of its own sovereign immunity; and other actions by state
officers (usually those taken in the course of litigation itself) that have the effect of relinquishing
state sovereign immunity. See infra Part I.C. Courts, scholars, and litigants have cared very
much about the first category, the ability of Congress to eliminate state sovereign immunity by
statute. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot
abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its Article I powers); Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress’s Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 539 (1995) (exploring mechanisms Congress could use to achieve the equivalent of abrogation of state sovereign immunity). That category, however, really describes a different situation that should be called by a different name. See infra Part I.C.
2. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
3. At the Supreme Court level, see Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 535 U.S.
613 (2002); Raygor v. Regents of Univ., 534 U.S. 533 (2002); Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524
U.S. 381 (1998).
The lower courts have struggled with, and gone into conflict regarding, the rules of waiver
doctrine. Compare, e.g., Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17, 26–29 (1st
Cir. 2001) (holding that waiver occurs when a state files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding); In re SDDS, Inc., 225 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that waiver occurs when a
state makes a general appearance and litigates on the merits), Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of
Md., 179 F.3d 754, 756–58 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the state waives immunity by failing to
raise it until the first day of trial), amended by 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000), Sutton v. Utah
State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that waiver occurs
when a state removes a case from state court to federal court and litigates on the merits), and In
re Burke, 146 F.3d 1313, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that waiver occurs when a state files
a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding) with Montgomery v. Maryland, 266 F.3d 334, 338–
39 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a state defendant is permitted to raise the immunity defense on
appeal despite the fact the immunity defense was expressly withdrawn while the case was
pending in district court), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1958 (2002), Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.
Sys., 251 F.3d 1372, 1378 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that removal does not give rise to waiver),
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The reason for this change is simple. Since its landmark decision in
4
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Supreme Court has steadily
constricted the set of circumstances in which private parties may sue
states. As this set diminishes, each remaining element in the set takes
on increased importance. Lawyers, courts, and scholars paid little attention to waivers of state sovereign immunity as long as there were
other mechanisms available for bringing suits against states; now that
waivers are almost the only game in town, everyone wants to play.
Because cases in which a state defendant waives its immunity make
up one of the very few remaining categories in which private suit
against states is permitted, it is essential that the boundaries of this
category be fully understood.5
Additionally, waivers of state sovereign immunity are of interest
because they provide a window into the ideology of state sovereign
immunity doctrine. They display, in microcosm, larger ideological
trends that run through the Supreme Court’s handling of federalism
issues. In early cases, the Supreme Court handled the issue of waivers
of state sovereign immunity in a reasonable way that appropriately
balanced state, federal, and private interests. Later, the issue became
ideologized. The larger trend of respecting states’ rights, particularly
state sovereign immunity, became so strong that it overrode all other
considerations. Even the rules regarding waiver had to be recast so

rev’d, 535 U.S. 613 (2002), Chittister v. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir.
2000) (holding that there is no waiver even though the case was tried in district court and the
state did not raise immunity until the case was on appeal), and Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ.,
224 F.3d 806, 816 (6th Cir. 2000) (same). See also LensCrafters, Inc. v. Sundquist, 184 F. Supp.
2d 753, 759 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (“[C]ircuits are split as to whether voluntary appearance and
defense on the merits constitutes waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
4. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
5. Although there has been little interest in waivers of state sovereign immunity until recently, I do not mean to suggest that the subject has been entirely neglected. For some analyses
of waivers of state sovereign immunity, see Christiana Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273
(2002); Gil Seinfeld, Waiver-In-Litigation: Eleventh Amendment Immunity and the Voluntariness
Question, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 871 (2002).
Scholars have paid a good deal of attention to the question of whether Congress can induce waivers of state sovereign immunity through the use of the federal spending power or
other federal powers. E.g., Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of
State Sovereign Immunity: The Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 439 (2002). This Article is primarily concerned with waivers of state sovereign immunity that result from actions taken by states in the context of litigation, but these other kinds
of waivers are discussed infra Part II.C and Part III.C.5.
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that they would conform to the Court’s overall ideology of state sov6
ereign immunity doctrine.
A careful review of the history of waiver doctrine reveals that, in
the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court erroneously conflated
two separate traditions. Prior to 1945, the Court had one line of cases
concerning states’ voluntary and knowing consent to suit, and another
line of cases concerning actions by state officers that had the effect of
waiving a state’s immunity from suit without consent. Although the
two concepts appear similar (and the term “waiver” is sometimes applied to both), the cases distinguished them and subjected them to
7
quite different rules. These pre-1945 decisions reflected an appropriate balance between the importance of states’ rights and the need for
sensible rules governing the operation of the federal judicial system.
Beginning in 1945 and continuing, with some backsliding, for
8
decades, the Court conflated the two lines of cases. This conflation
led to paradoxes and contradictions that reflected the elevation of
state sovereign immunity from an important but waivable defense
into an almost sacred principle. Other values, including obvious,
common-sense rules about how to run the federal judicial system,
were sacrificed. Such elevation and sacrifice are possible only in the
context of an ideologized doctrine of state sovereign immunity.
Interestingly, however, notwithstanding the great and continuing
strength of the Supreme Court’s overall push on federalism issues, the
most recent trend regarding waivers of state sovereign immunity represents a return to the prior, more reasonable rules. In two recent
9
cases—Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht and Lapides
10
v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia —the Court
has retreated from the post-1945 waiver cases and explicitly overruled
the most troublesome case from the ideologized period.11 It appears
that the Court has once again made room for reasonable, commonsense rules of waiver within the larger doctrine of state sovereign immunity.
The lower courts’ reception of the Supreme Court’s most recent
cases has not, however, been uniform. Some lower courts have cor-

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
524 U.S. 381 (1998).
535 U.S. 613 (2002).
See infra Part II.E.

SIEGEL.DOC

1172

10/10/03 9:38 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:1167

rectly understood Schacht and Lapides to reinstate the reasonable,
pre-1945 rules governing state consent to suit and waiver of immunity
from suit without consent. Others, however, still embrace the ideology of the post-1945 cases and have given Schacht and Lapides very
12
narrow readings.
This Article attempts to de-ideologize the doctrine of waiver of
state sovereign immunity, to explain the Supreme Court’s decisions in
this context, and to resurrect the useful distinction between cases
about state consent to suit and cases about state waiver of immunity
from suit. The Article seeks to show that there is room, even within
the Supreme Court’s broad doctrine of state sovereign immunity, for
a sensible doctrine of waiver. Such a sensible, non-ideologized doctrine would not be as favorable to states as the rules created by the
13
Court’s post-1945 waiver cases, but neither would it deny the importance of respect for state interests that is at the heart of the Court’s
sovereign immunity doctrine.14
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the rule of state sovereign
immunity and its chief exceptions, emphasizing the reasons why the
exception permitting waiver of state sovereign immunity has taken on
increased importance. Part II traces the development of the rules
governing state consent to suit and other waivers of state sovereign
immunity and notes how these reasonably sensible rules became
ideologized in the mid-twentieth century. Part III suggests how to
mend the doctrine of waiver of state sovereign immunity.
I. THE RULE OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND ITS
EXCEPTIONS
The story of the Supreme Court’s development and expansion of
state sovereign immunity doctrine is a familiar one that need be recounted only briefly here. Without attempting much normative analysis, this Part describes the development of the rule of state sovereign
immunity and its most important exceptions. The focus is on understanding why the rules of consent and waiver have taken on increased
importance.
12. See infra notes 296–97 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that a state’s failure seasonably to raise the issue of
its immunity from suit should constitute a waiver of that immunity).
14. See, e.g., infra Part III.C.3 (arguing that a state’s removal of a suit from state court to
federal court should constitute a waiver only of the state’s immunity from a federal forum, not a
waiver of the state’s immunity from liability).
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A. The Rule of State Sovereign Immunity
The issue of state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court
is older than the Constitution itself: it arose during debates over the
Constitution’s ratification, when opponents of ratification drew attention to the provision, in Article III, for federal jurisdiction over suits
“between a State and Citizens of another State.”15 This provision,
Anti-Federalists observed, appeared to apply just as much to suits in
which a state is a defendant as to suits in which a state is a plaintiff. In
particular, it appeared to permit suits against states upon their debts,
which could be conveyed to someone who was not a citizen of the
debtor state.16 The financial condition of many states at the time was
such that suits on their debts could have caused them considerable
embarrassment.17
Proponents of ratification assured opponents that the Constitution was not intended to countenance suits against states for the pay18
ment of debt. Shortly after the Constitution’s adoption, however, an
out-of-state creditor of Georgia began just such a suit in the United
States Supreme Court, in the Court’s original jurisdiction.19 The
Court, relying on the plain text of Article III (among other considera20
21
tions), held that such an action would indeed lie. A shocked Congress quickly adopted, and the states ratified, the Eleventh Amendment, which provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against

15.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526–27 (photo. reprint 1941) (Jonathan
Eliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]
(statement of George Mason); id. at 543 (statement of Patrick Henry).
16. ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 15, at 542–43 (statement of Patrick Henry); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
17. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 99 (1928).
18. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is inherent in
the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. . . .
[T]here is no color to pretend that the State governments would . . . be divested of the privilege
of paying their own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from
the obligations of good faith.”).
19. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1793).
20. Id. at 452 (Blair, J.); id. at 466 (Wilson, J.); id. at 469 (Cushing, J.); id. at 479 (Jay, C.J.).
21. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (stating that the decision in Chisolm created “a shock of surprise throughout the country”); 1 WARREN, supra note 17, at 96 (“The decision fell upon the country with a profound shock.”).
ON THE
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one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
22
or Subjects of any Foreign State.

The Eleventh Amendment’s enigmatic text created problems
and paradoxes that remain difficult to explain today. On the one
hand, the amendment clearly seems textually limited to suits against a
state by citizens of another state (or by foreign citizens or subjects),
and so it would appear to have no application to a suit against a state
by one of its own citizens. On the other hand, when a suit is brought
against a state by a citizen of another state, the amendment’s text contains nothing that would appear to limit its application based on the
nature of the suit (provided it be a “suit in law or equity”). Thus, the
amendment would, in particular, appear to apply equally to suits
based on state and federal law.
A literal reading of the amendment might, therefore, lead to the
conclusion that the amendment bars all suits in law or equity brought
in federal court against a state by a citizen of another state, but permits suits in federal court against a state by its own citizens—provided, of course, that they are otherwise within the federal jurisdic23
tion. Curiously, this “literal” interpretation of the Eleventh
24
Amendment has almost no adherents. It would lead to the paradoxical result that a private citizen could sue her own state on a federal
cause of action, but a citizen of another state could not sue the state
on an identical claim. This result is paradoxical because under the
Constitution the presence of an interstate element in a case typically
enhances, rather than detracts from, the basis for the exercise of fed-

22. U.S. CONST. amend XI. Congress adopted the amendment in March, 1794, just a little
over a year after the Chisolm decision. It took the states, however, almost four years to ratify
the amendment. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 726–37 (1971).
23. I annually ask my students in Federal Courts what they understand to be the literal
meaning of the text of the Eleventh Amendment. The reading given above is the most popular
answer, but it is not universal. Some students say that the text literally indicates the “diversity”
reading explained in the following paragraphs; others offer still other “literal” readings. See infra note 24.
24. For a rare exception, see Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh
Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1346 (1989). Another scholar also recommends applying
the amendment literally, although in his view the literal reading permits congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Steven Breker-Cooper, The Eleventh Amendment: A Textual
Solution, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1481, 1482 (1992).

SIEGEL.DOC

2003]

10/10/03 9:38 AM

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1175

25
eral jurisdiction. The “literal” reading of the Eleventh Amendment
therefore makes little sense.
As a result, most interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment
depart from this literal reading. The two principal readings may be
termed the “official” reading and the “diversity” reading. The “diversity” reading, advocated by numerous scholars and some judges, argues that the Eleventh Amendment simply repealed the portion of
Article III of the Constitution that conferred federal judicial power
26
over cases between a state and citizens of another state. It did not
bar a case fitting that description from being heard in federal court if
27
the case was otherwise within the federal jurisdiction. Thus, under
this theory, the Eleventh Amendment bars cases such as Chisolm itself, in which a private plaintiff sues a state on a state law cause of action and the case is in federal court only because of the diversity of
the parties.28 The Eleventh Amendment does not, under the diversity
reading, bar a private party from suing a state in federal court on a
federal cause of action, whether or not the plaintiff is a citizen of the
defendant state, because such a claim can proceed under the “federal
question” jurisdiction.29
The diversity theory respects the limiting language of the Eleventh Amendment, which limits application of the amendment to suits
against states by citizens of other states. Its textual weakness is that it
must confront the broad language defining the types of cases that the
amendment apparently bars: “any suit in law or equity” that falls
within the party configurations listed in the amendment. This weakness is not necessarily insuperable—diversity theorists have explained

25. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (conferring federal judicial power over cases
“between Citizens of different States”).
26. To be precise, it repealed part of that provision: it repealed the grant of judicial power
over cases between a state and citizens of another state where the state is the defendant. It did
not affect the provision’s application to cases where the state is the plaintiff. For judicial explanations of the diversity theory, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 101–16 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 258–302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For scholarly explanations, see, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989); John J.
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).
27. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“If federal jurisdiction is based on
the existence of a federal question or some other clause of Article III . . . the Eleventh Amendment has no relevance.”).
28. Id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that the amendment’s text is directed specifically at the state-citizen
30
diversity clause of Article III —but it is a textual difficulty.
30. See, e.g., id. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the “rather legalistic
terms” of the Eleventh Amendment exist because the amendment was intended to remedy Chisolm’s interpretation of the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses in Article III as themselves abrogating state sovereign immunity). Justice Brennan’s otherwise comprehensive opinion omits one potentially powerful explanation for how the Eleventh Amendment’s text could
have taken its curious form if it was intended to embody the diversity theory. In 1805, Senator
Breckenridge proposed to amend the Constitution to provide that:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to controversies between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different
States, between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different
States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens, or
subjects.
14 ANNALS OF CONG. 53 (1805). Evidently this proposal was intended to repeal all forms of diversity jurisdiction, but surely no one could think that the statement that “[t]he judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to controversies . . . between citizens of different States” was intended to eliminate federal judicial power over suits between citizens of
different states that were based on federal questions. That would make no sense at all; it would
limit the federal question jurisdiction to cases that arose under federal law and were between
citizens of the same state. (Actually, it would also allow a federal question case between aliens,
but not between an alien and a citizen—another nonsensical result.)
The language of the Breckenridge proposal closely parallels that of the Eleventh
Amendment. If Senator Breckenridge could have imagined, as he evidently did, that his language would have the effect of repealing diversity jurisdiction but not of affirmatively barring
cases that fell within the party configurations listed in the amendment if the cases were otherwise within the federal jurisdiction, then perhaps it is not so strange after all to give a similar
reading to the text of the Eleventh Amendment: it repeals the state-citizen and state-alien diversity jurisdiction but does not bar cases falling within those party configurations if they are
otherwise within the federal jurisdiction.
Countering this argument, Professor Lawrence Marshall finds a “crucial” distinction between the Breckenridge proposal and the actual text of the Eleventh Amendment: the Eleventh
Amendment refers to “any suit in law or equity,” whereas the Breckenridge proposal uses the
term “controversies.” Lawrence Marshall, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 127, 129 (1990). This latter term, Marshall argues, has a much narrower significance than
the broad language used in the Eleventh Amendment; it evokes only the last six categories of
Article III judicial power, not the first three, which Article III refers to as “cases” rather than as
“controversies.” Id. at 129–30.
I would respectfully suggest that Marshall reads far too much into this slight linguistic difference. Marshall claims that “[a]lthough Breckenridge modeled his proposal on the Eleventh
Amendment, he deliberately departed from its broad formulation,” but his accompanying footnote provides no support for the key word “deliberately.” Id. at 130 n.11. It is easy to imagine a
far greater degree of precision in drafting constitutional amendments than likely exists. Think
back to the balanced budget amendment that Congress considered in 1995. H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th
Cong. (1995). Did anyone really understand the precise meaning of the text of the amendment—including all the different versions of that text that were proposed? E.g., id.; H.R.J. Res.
7, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 15, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 20, 104th Cong. (1995);
H.R.J. Res. 21, 104th Cong. (1995) (each a different version of a balanced budget amendment).
Yet the amendment came within one vote of passing the Congress. Michael Wines, Senate Rejects Amendment on Balancing the Budget; Close Vote Is Blow to G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
1995, at A1.
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The diversity reading has never received the blessing of the Su31
preme Court. Instead, since its 1890 decision in Hans v. Louisiana,
the Court has adhered to what may be called the “official” reading of
the Eleventh Amendment, which provides that the amendment bars
private suits against states regardless of whether the cause of action is
based on state or federal law and regardless of whether the plaintiff is
a citizen of the defendant state.32 The textual problems of this reading
are opposite to those of the diversity theory: the official theory respects the broad language in the Eleventh Amendment (specifically,
the words “any suit”), but ignores all of the limiting language. To
avoid the problem created by the limited text of the Eleventh
Amendment, some cases decided under the official theory declared
that the Eleventh Amendment is merely an exemplification of a
larger principle of state sovereign immunity, a principle that does not
derive from the Eleventh Amendment and therefore is not limited by
its text.33 Other cases applying the official theory declared that the
amendment itself bars cases without regard to its apparent textual
34
limitations. Freed, one way or the other, from textual limitation, the
Supreme Court has held that state sovereign immunity bars suits
against states by their own citizens,35 by federally chartered corpora36
37
38
tions, by Indian tribes, and by foreign states; it bars private parties

31. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
32. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1974); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S.
311, 314 (1920).
33. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he sovereign immunity of the States
neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”); Ex parte New
York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921):
[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to
entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not
one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State,
because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens,
because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.
34. E.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 535 U.S. 613, 616 (2002) (“The Eleventh Amendment grants a State immunity from suit in federal court . . . by its own citizens . . . .”); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472–73 (1987):
[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing suit against the citizen’s own
State in federal court, even though the express terms of the Amendment refer only to
suits by citizens of another State. . . . [T]he Amendment bars suits in admiralty against
the States, even though such suits are not, strictly speaking, “suits in law or equity.”
35.
36.
37.
38.

Hans, 134 U.S. at 14–15.
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445–49 (1900).
Blatchford v. Native Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 787–82 (1991).
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329–32 (1934).
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39
from suing states in admiralty; and it bars private parties from suing
states in the states’ own courts,40 even though none of these actions
fall within the text of the Eleventh Amendment.
The purpose of this Article is not to choose between the official
theory and the diversity theory. If one were to choose the diversity
theory, then the issue addressed in this Article would evaporate: there
would be no need to decide whether a state has waived its immunity
from suit under federal law if that immunity did not exist in the first
place. Necessarily, then, this Article begins by assuming the official
theory arguendo—a very natural assumption, given that the official
41
theory has held sway in the Supreme Court for more than a century.
The question is whether, even acting on that assumption, and taking
seriously the respect for states’ rights that the assumption entails, the
Supreme Court’s rules regarding waiver of state sovereign immunity
are justified.

B. Three Limited Exceptions
The expansive, official doctrine of state sovereign immunity creates serious problems of governance. Federal law is the supreme law
of the land,42 and federal law may properly regulate the behavior of
states.43 States are, therefore, bound by federal law, but when they
violate it, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity prevents injured
parties from suing states for relief.
This rule, if fully applied, would tend to rob federal law of its
force insofar as states are concerned. To be sure, state officials might
44
choose to comply with federal law simply out of a sense of duty, but
if they knew that no penalty could result from their violations of federal law, they might choose to violate it when the state would derive
some benefit from the violation. This is not to suggest that state ac39.
40.
41.

Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497–500 (1921).
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 741–54 (1999).
Cf. Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1612 (2002) (explaining that even those who disagree with the official theory may find it instructive to consider whether certain premises of the official theory justify current doctrine).
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
43. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554–57 (1985) (holding
that Congress may subject states to the minimum wage laws).
44. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1428–49 (2000)
(describing social, bureaucratic, and political forces that tend to promote state compliance with
federal law).
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tors are venal or malicious, but simply to suggest that, like anyone
else, they probably have at least some tendency to act in accordance
with their economic incentives. Legal liability is a great engine for inducing compliance with legal norms. If that engine were turned off
with respect to private actors, one would certainly expect less private
45
compliance with the law; the same is likely true of state actors. Thus,
it would appear that, under the official doctrine, the Constitution
makes federal law binding upon the states while simultaneously depriving that law of actual force—a paradoxical result.
Things are not quite that bad, however, because even the official
theory does not enforce the principle of state sovereign immunity
with all possible rigor; rather, it allows certain exceptions to the immunity principle. In light of the pressing need for some mechanism to
enforce federal law against the states, these exceptions are of great
practical and theoretical importance. The scope of the exceptions determines whether state sovereign immunity really frees state officials
to violate federal law without redress or whether it merely makes obtaining redress more difficult and cumbersome.
Current law recognizes four principal exceptions to the rule of
state sovereign immunity. Perhaps the most important exception is
that state sovereign immunity does not prevent an injured private
party from suing a state officer and obtaining an order that the officer
cease conduct that violates federal law. This exception, commonly as46
sociated with the case of Ex parte Young, derives from the notion
45. Alexander Hamilton made this point at the time of the Constitution’s adoption in explaining why the federal courts would need to have power to overrule state actions that violated
constitutional restrictions on state behavior. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 475–76 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“No man of sense will believe that such prohibitions
would be scrupulously regarded without some effectual power in the government to restrain or
correct the infractions of them.”).
Professor Meltzer rightly observes that whether retrospective monetary remedies would
make state officials more likely to comply with federal law is really an empirical question. Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1338 (2001). However, in the absence of a persuasive empirical showing to
the contrary, it seems reasonable to start with the presumption that economic incentives play at
least some role in determining state officials’ behavior. Also, as Meltzer observes, to the extent
the question is empirical, Congress must be in a better position than courts to answer it. See id.
at 1337–43; cf. Menell, supra note 44, at 1433–34 (suggesting that social and bureaucratic constraints are likely to operate in “most areas of state activity” but may have less effect on, for example, research conducted at state universities, because of the increasing commercialization of
such research).
46. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Actually, in many respects, the officer suit form predates Young.
See, e.g., The Va. Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 293 (1885) (permitting suits against state officers
as a remedy for the state’s failure to honor its promise to accept its own past-due bond coupons
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that state sovereign immunity applies only to the state itself and does
47
not protect state officers who are acting unlawfully. The fictional na48
ture of this reasoning is widely recognized. Because a state acts only
through its officers, an order restraining the officer restrains the state.
The fictional distinction between them exists only to mitigate the rigors of state sovereign immunity doctrine, to provide at least some relief to private parties injured by state violations of federal law, and to
permit some mechanism for curing such violations.49
The Ex parte Young principle provides an important mechanism
for the enforcement of federal law, but it has a significant limitation:
it applies only to cases in which an injured plaintiff seeks only prospective, injunctive relief. The Supreme Court—without, perhaps, a
particularly persuasive explanation—has held that state sovereign
immunity bars a suit against a state officer seeking retrospective
monetary damages that would have to be paid from the state treasury.50 Thus, this exception to state sovereign immunity provides some

in payment of taxes); Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1622–44 (1997) (describing the history of officer suits and the significance of Young).
47. 209 U.S. at 159–60.
48. See, e.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 539 (1980) (referring to cases where “the action is based upon the fiction that the officer is acting as an individual”); Tonkawa Tribe v. Richards, 75 F.3d 1039, 1048 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that Eleventh Amendment immunity is
circumvented where “the suit is instituted under a fiction which allows suits for prospective injunctive relief against a state official in vindication of a federal right”); In re McVey Trucking,
Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1987) (“These cases rely on the admitted fiction that the court
order is against the state officer, not against the state.”); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 509–10
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“To avoid the bar of sovereign immunity, courts indulged the fiction that a
remedy could be had against a government officer, even though, in reality, relief would come
from the government itself.”).
49. See Siegel, supra note 46, at 1622–70 (describing the origin and purpose of officer suit
fiction).
50. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). The ultimate reason for this rule is clear
enough—without it state sovereign immunity would have no practical force whatever—but the
distinction is doctrinally unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the rule raises yet another textual problem. The Eleventh Amendment applies to “any suit in law or equity,” so if the fictional
distinction between a state officer and a state avoids the Eleventh Amendment bar with regard
to suits in equity (seeking injunctive relief), it is not clear why it should not be equally effective
with regard to suits at law (seeking money damages). Second, the rule is undermined by the Supreme Court’s approval of prospective injunctive relief that requires a state to spend money; the
Court justifies such relief by the less-than-persuasive distinction that the resulting spending is
merely “ancillary” to the permitted injunctive relief. Id. at 668. Finally, the Court has stated that
once a court issues a prospective injunctive order against a state officer, violation of that order
may be punished by imposition of retroactive monetary penalties, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
690–91 (1978), and it is not clear why states should be any less exposed to retroactive monetary
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relief to injured parties, but it does not permit them to get full relief
for their injuries.
Another important exception is that states have no immunity
51
from suits brought by other states or by the United States. According to the official theory, states consented to such suits when they
52
ratified the Constitution or subsequently joined the Union. The exception for suits by the United States is particularly important, because the United States is always an appropriate party to bring an action for the enforcement of federal law.53 Accordingly, although
private parties may not use damage actions to enforce federal law
against states, the federal government may itself enforce federal
law—apparently including federal law that regulates the behavior of
states toward private parties—by bringing actions for monetary relief
against states that violate federal law.54 Federal officials may even, it
appears, collect money from states that have violated federal law and
distribute it to the victims of the violations.55
The application of this exception, however, may require the ap56
proval of federal officials on a case-by-case basis. Thus, an injured
private party would get no benefit from this exception if federal officials chose not to sue on the private party’s behalf. Private parties
typically have no control over whether the federal government
chooses to bring a lawsuit, and federal officials might decline to do so
for many reasons, such as limited resources, disagreement with the
damages for violating a federal law than for violating a federal court order enforcing that same
law.
51. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904); United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621, 642–46 (1892).
52. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999); Texas, 143 U.S. at 646.
53. Jonathan R. Siegel, Congress’s Power to Authorize Suits Against States, 68 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 44, 67–71 (1999).
54. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755–60.
55. Id. at 759. The relevant passage in Alden is dictum, but it is supported by the uniform
holdings of numerous lower courts and does not appear to be controversial. See Siegel, supra
note 53, at 69–70 (collecting cases upholding this view).
56. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 759–60:
The difference between a suit by the United States on behalf of the employees and a
suit by the employees implicates a rule that the National Government must itself
deem the case of sufficient importance to take action against the State; and history,
precedent, and the structure of the Constitution make clear that, under the plan of
the Convention, the States have consented to suits of the first kind but not of the second.
But see Siegel, supra note 53, at 66–110 (explaining statutory mechanisms that Congress might
use to achieve all, or nearly all, that might be achieved by permitting private parties to sue states
directly).
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merits of the private party’s case, or a desire not to interfere with
state authorities.
Therefore, while these two exceptions provide important mechanisms for bringing suits against states that violate federal law, they
leave a core blockage against such suits: private parties may not, on
their own, sue states for retrospective monetary relief. In many cases,
this bar may leave private parties without an effective means of redress for injuries they have suffered. Also, as noted above, it may be
expected to have an adverse effect on state compliance with federal
law. Consequently, the question of whether any other exception to
the rule of state sovereign immunity permits effective, private suit
against states is of great importance.
For a brief period, it looked as though the answer was yes. The
third exception to the rule of state sovereign immunity, discovered by
57
the Supreme Court in the 1976 case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, is that
Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity by passing a statute
58
that expressly provides for private damage suits against states. The
Court held in Fitzpatrick that a state’s employees may sue the state
59
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court said that
Congress’s power, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
enforce the provisions of the amendment by “appropriate” legislation, permits Congress to override the states’ sovereign immunity.60
The Court’s opinion in Fitzpatrick left unclear whether Congress’s power of abrogation applied only to statutes, such as Title VII,
that are based on Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In 1989, however, the Court appeared to resolve the
matter in favor of Congress’s authority. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
61
Co., the Court held that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity and provide for private actions against states when exercising
62
its powers under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause. This decision
appeared to promise a broad avenue for enforcement of federal law
against states. So long as Congress sanctioned private suits against

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
part).

427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Id. at 456.
Id. at 447–48, 456.
Id. at 456.
491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 23 (plurality opinion); id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

SIEGEL.DOC

2003]

10/10/03 9:38 AM

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1183

states, and expressed its approval in clear language, such suits would
be permitted. Union Gas essentially left the matter up to Congress.
The rule of Union Gas was, however, short-lived. Just seven
63
years later, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court over64
ruled it. Seminole Tribe held that Congress’s ability to abrogate state
sovereign immunity was limited to actions provided pursuant to Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 Congress may not, the Court said, abrogate state sovereign immunity
when acting pursuant to its powers under Article I of the Constitution.66 The “abrogation” exception was thus very significantly reduced.
Moreover, Seminole Tribe marked the beginning of a series of
cases in which the Supreme Court methodically restricted or eliminated exceptions to the rule of state sovereign immunity. Throughout
its history, state sovereign immunity doctrine has followed a meandering course, sometimes expanding, sometimes contracting, and frequently allowing by subterfuge what it has forbidden by direct at67
tack. The current period, however, is one of increasingly strict
enforcement. This time, the Supreme Court seems to be saying that it
really means to enforce the rule of state sovereign immunity and that
it will not permit private parties to finesse it with exceptions.
Thus, for example, following Seminole Tribe, the Court held in
68
Alden v. Maine that the rule of state sovereign immunity applies just
as much to cases brought in state courts as to cases brought in federal
courts; private parties cannot avoid sovereign immunity simply by a
change of forum.69 On the same day, in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
70
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court
adopted a very narrow interpretation of Congress’s powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby guaranteeing that
the use of the “abrogation” exception to state sovereign immunity

63. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
64. Id. at 66.
65. Id. at 65–66.
66. Id. at 73.
67. The prime example is of course Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which held that
private parties may sue a state officer for prospective injunctive relief, even though sovereign
immunity bars the same relief in an action—exactly equivalent in all practical respects—against
the state itself. Id. at 168.
68. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
69. Id. at 712.
70. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).

SIEGEL.DOC

1184

10/10/03 9:38 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:1167

71
would be very limited. Thus, the Court has substantially cut back on
the set of cases in which an exception to the rule of state sovereign
immunity permits private suit against states, and the Court continues
to cut back further almost every Term.72
As a result of this continued tightening of the categories of permitted suits against states, it becomes vital to explore carefully the
boundaries of each remaining category. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has, since Seminole Tribe, taken cases that pursue just such exploration of the three exceptions to state sovereign immunity mentioned
above: Seminole Tribe itself and the case of Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene
73
74
Tribe of Idaho have placed limits on the Ex parte Young exception;
75
the case of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. Stevens explored
the meaning of the exception for suits against states “by the United
States” (although it was ultimately decided on a different ground);76
and a whole series of cases has explored the limits of Congress’s ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity by using its powers under
77
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. With regard to each category, the result has been a tightening of the remaining exceptions.

C. The Fourth Exception—Consent and Waiver
The continuing pressure placed on these three exceptions to the
rule of state sovereign immunity has focused attention on the fourth,
little-discussed exception: the exception for cases in which a state
consents to suit or in some other way waives its sovereign immunity.
71. Id. at 637–48.
72. In recent Terms, cutbacks have primarily taken the form of cases further constricting
Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of
Univ. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360, 367, 372–74 (2001) (holding that Section 5 cannot support
the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000)
(holding that Section 5 cannot support the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
73. 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (plurality opinion).
74. In each of these cases, the Court declined to apply the usual principle that sovereign
immunity does not bar a suit against a state officer for prospective injunctive relief. In Seminole
Tribe, the Court held that the remedial provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act impliedly precluded the courts from granting relief on an Ex parte Young theory, 517 U.S. 44, 74
(1996), and in Coeur d’Alene Tribe the Court held that the Ex parte Young theory does not apply to an Indian tribe’s claim of title to and regulatory jurisdiction over state lands, 521 U.S. at
281 (plurality opinion); id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
75. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
76. Id. at 768. The Court ultimately decided that the statute under which the plaintiff sued
did not, as a matter of statutory interpretation, apply to state defendants. Id. at 787.
77. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
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This exception should be distinguished from the exception, discussed
above, for cases in which Congress abrogates state immunity by federal statute. The language of “waiver” is sometimes used, a little
78
carelessly perhaps, to describe both kinds of cases, but it is more expedient to have different terms for the different situations of elimination of a state’s sovereign immunity by the state’s own actions and its
elimination by an outside force. Thus, it is best to say (and courts and
scholars usually do say) that Congress may sometimes abrogate a
state’s sovereign immunity, but that a state may waive its own immunity.79
The principle that a state may waive its own sovereign immunity
80
traces back to the 1883 case of Clark v. Barnard. Clark concerned
81
the bankruptcy of a railroad. Prior to bankruptcy, the railroad’s directors had given $100,000 in company funds to the treasurer of Boston (taking his note for that sum in return), and they had given a

78. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 271 F.3d 629, 631 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[T]his court held that Congress’s attempt to waive state sovereign immunity through 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1993) was unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 323 n.2
(6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Interstate Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the power to
waive state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment . . . . “).
79. See, e.g., Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 749–50 (2002)
(“Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers, cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity . . . .”);
id. at 782 (noting that a court would not compel a State’s obedience to the Shipping Act’s requirements “absent a State’s voluntary waiver of sovereign immunity”); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (“Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate the States’ sovereign
immunity . . . .”); id. at 757 (“The sole remaining question is whether Maine has waived its immunity.”); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675
(1999) (“We turn next to the question whether Florida’s sovereign immunity, though not abrogated, was voluntarily waived.”); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 57 (1996) (“Congress
intended through the Act to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit.”); id. at 65
(“States may waive their sovereign immunity . . . .”); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 102 n.133 (2001) (“Congress
may not abrogate state sovereign immunity when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers.”); id.
(noting that states can still be held liable for violations of federal law through “conditional federal spending schemes designed to induce the states to waive their immunity”); Joanne C. Brant,
The Ascent of Sovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 767, 776 (1998) (“Hans sheds no light on
the question of congressional power to abrogate.”); id. (“‘[C]onstitutionalizing’ Hans . . . exacerbates its errors and renders problematic the state’s power to waive its sovereign immunity and
consent to suit.”).
80. 108 U.S. 436 (1883). Clark is the standard early case cite for the proposition that a state
may consent to suit or waive its immunity. E.g., Raygor v. Regents of the Univ., 534 U.S. 533,
547 (2002) (citing to Clark v. Barnard); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 670 (same); Wis. Dep’t of
Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998) (same); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney,
495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990) (same).
81. 108 U.S. at 442.
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82
$100,000 bond to the treasurer of Rhode Island. The railroad’s assignees in bankruptcy initially sued both of these treasurers and
sought an order that the Boston treasurer pay the money to them, not
to the Rhode Island treasurer.83 Rhode Island asserted its sovereign
immunity from such a suit.84 The Boston treasurer paid the money
85
into court, after which Rhode Island made a claim on it. The court
awarded the money to the railroad’s assignees, and Rhode Island
again objected on the ground of sovereign immunity.86
The Supreme Court held that Rhode Island had waived its sovereign immunity by intervening as a claimant to the fund in the fed87
eral court. Although it had begun the proceeding as a defendant, the
proceeding subsequently changed: once the Boston treasurer had
paid the money into court, the proceeding essentially became an interpleader action.88 Rhode Island voluntarily appeared in that action.89
A state’s sovereign immunity, the Court observed, “is a personal
privilege [that the state] may waive at pleasure.”90 By voluntarily appearing in the federal court and making an affirmative claim to the
fund within the court’s control, Rhode Island had “made itself a party
to the litigation to the full extent required for its complete determina91
tion.”
At least since Clark, the courts have taken as a given that cases in
which a state waives its immunity constitute an exception to the rule
92
that state sovereign immunity bars private actions against states.
What, however, are the boundaries of this exception? Who can waive
immunity on behalf of a state? What actions constitute such a waiver?
Are waivers irrevocable? In light of the continued tightening of other
mechanisms for private actions against states, these questions have
taken on a new urgency.

82. Id. at 443–44.
83. Id. at 444–45.
84. Id. at 445.
85. Id. at 445–46.
86. Id. at 446–47.
87. Id. at 447.
88. Id. at 448.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 447.
91. Id. at 448.
92. E.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
675 (1999) (“We have long recognized that a State’s sovereign immunity is ‘a personal privilege
which it may waive at pleasure.’” (quoting Clark, 108 U.S. at 447)).
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II. THE IDEOLOGIZATION OF WAIVER DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court’s approach to the issue of waiver may be divided into distinct periods, with the 1945 case of Ford Motor Co. v.
93
Department of Treasury of Indiana marking an important dividing
line. Two notable principles characterized the pre-1945 cases. First,
the pre-1945 cases recognized two distinct traditions governing two
different kinds of waivers. In some cases, a state voluntarily, know94
ingly, and intentionally agreed to be sued. In other cases, state officials took actions that had the effect of relinquishing the state’s sovereign immunity whether they knew it or not and whether they
intended it or not.95 Very different rules governed these different
kinds of cases.
Unfortunately, these two kinds of cases do not have distinct,
standard names. Both may be said to involve “waiver” of state sover96
eign immunity. Inasmuch, however, as the cases were governed by
quite different rules, it will prove useful to have different terms for
them. Drawing on the language of the pre-1945 cases, this Article will
say that when a state voluntarily and knowingly agrees to be sued, it
has consented to suit, and that when a state’s actions otherwise eliminate its immunity, the state has waived its immunity from suit without
consent.97 The choice of these terms is somewhat arbitrary (and,
where context permits, the term “waiver” will still refer to both kinds
of cases), but the key point is that, whatever terms are used, there
were two different concepts that the cases treated very differently.98
The second notable point about the pre-1945 cases is that they
struck a balance between states’ rights and the reasonable and legitimate interests of private plaintiffs and the federal judicial system.
State sovereignty was not the only value the Court considered as it
made its decisions. The Court also considered the effect of immunity
on plaintiffs and on the judicial system itself.
93. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
94. See infra Part II.A.1.
95. See infra Part II.A.2.
96. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (“[T]he
State’s action joining the removing of this case to federal court waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity . . . .”); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985) (“A State may
effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a state statute or constitutional provision . . . .”).
97. See Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“Although a state
may not be sued without its consent, such immunity is a privilege which may be waived . . . .”).
98. See infra Part II.A.
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Starting in 1945 and continuing until quite recently, the Court’s
rulings reflected a sharp hardening and ideologization of state sovereign immunity principles. The Court conflated the lines of cases concerning consent and waiver. State sovereign immunity was transformed from an important but rather easily waivable defense into an
almost sacred principle that could be avoided only by the clearest and
99
most unequivocal consent to suit or waiver of immunity.
Then, starting in 1998, the Court created a countertrend. The
Court’s most recent cases overruled Ford Motor Co. and vitiated the
rules of the post-1945 period. The trend is to return to the traditional
100
rules regarding waivers of state sovereign immunity.
This Part first explores these little-known cases descriptively, in
order to understand what the Court has done and to exhume the useful, but lost, distinction between consent cases and waiver cases. The
next Part examines this area normatively and explains the way in
which a non-ideological doctrine would approach the question of
waivers of state sovereign immunity.
A. The Traditional Rules of Consent and Waiver
Prior to 1945, the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence combined severity with mildness. On the one hand, during
this period, the Court created and continually expanded the rule that
state sovereign immunity bars suits against states without regard to
101
the text of the Eleventh Amendment. It also looked askance at
claims that a state had consented to suit in federal court.102 On the
other hand, the Court tempered the rigors of immunity by recogniz103
ing waivers of a state’s immunity from suit without consent. In general, the Court treated the defense of state sovereign immunity rather
99. See infra Part II.B.
100. See infra Part II.E.
101. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329–30 (1934) (holding that immunity applies
to suits against a state by a foreign state, although a foreign state is not a “citizen or subject of”
a foreign state); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (holding that immunity applies to
suits in admiralty against a state, even though the Eleventh Amendment refers only to suits in
law or equity); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 449 (1900) (holding that immunity applies to suits
against states by federally chartered corporations, even though such corporations are neither
citizens of any other state nor citizens or subjects of a foreign state); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 20 (1890) (holding that immunity bars a suit against a state by one of its own citizens, even
though the Eleventh Amendment covers suits only by citizens of other states or by citizens or
subjects of a foreign state).
102. See infra Part II.A.1.
103. See infra Part II.A.2.
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like the defense of personal jurisdiction. The defense certainly existed
and could lead to dismissal of a case, but the defendant had to assert
the defense, and had to do so in a timely fashion. If the defense was
not seasonably asserted, it was waived and could not be reasserted
thereafter.
1. Consent Cases. In cases in which a state had allegedly consented to suit against itself, the Supreme Court employed very strict,
pro-state rules. Consent to suit, the Court held, was “altogether voluntary” on the part of a state, and a state was free to set conditions on
any consent that it chose to give.104 In particular, a state could consent
105
to be sued in its own courts, but not in federal courts. Indeed, not
only could a state give such a limited consent, but the Supreme Court
held as early as 1900 that it was appropriate to read state consent
statutes narrowly and interpret them to permit suit against the state
only in its own courts, even when that restriction was not clearly
specified.106 This rule has persisted.107
Moreover, and perhaps most strikingly, the Court held that, because a state’s consent to suit was wholly voluntary, a state remained
free to withdraw its consent, even after a suit against it had com108
menced in accordance with that consent. In Beers v. Arkansas, the
plaintiff sued Arkansas in its own courts, as state law permitted, for
109
failure to pay on state bonds. Subsequently, the state legislature enacted a new statute providing that, in any such suit, the court should
order that the original bonds be filed with the court, and, if they were
not so filed, the case should be dismissed.110 The plaintiff, upon being
104. Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858).
105. Reeves, 178 U.S. at 441.
106. Id.
107. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676
(1999); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
108. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 527.
109. Id. at 528.
110. Id. Arkansas’s requirement was just one of many schemes used by states to avoid paying bond debts throughout the nineteenth century. For example, Virginia, after defaulting on its
bond obligations, managed to obtain new credit in 1871 by issuing bonds with a statutory promise that the bond coupons, if past maturity, could be used to pay any tax owed to the state. Then,
in 1882, the state passed a new statute directing its tax collectors to refuse to accept the coupons
in payment of taxes. Poindexter v. Greenhow (Virginia Coupon Cases), 114 U.S. 269, 273–74
(1885). Other states, including Mississippi and Florida, simply repudiated their debts.
MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 144 (1970). The frustration of state bondholders following Pennsylvania’s repudiation of its debts in 1843 was expressed in this acerbic letter to the Morning Chronicle:
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ordered to file his bonds in accordance with the law, failed to do so,
111
and his case was dismissed. The plaintiff took the case to the Supreme Court on the claim that Arkansas’s modification of its prior
consent to be sued impaired the obligation of its contracts in violation
of the Contracts Clause of the federal Constitution.112
The Supreme Court might have treated the case narrowly; it
could have held that Arkansas had not withdrawn its consent to be
sued but had merely regulated the procedures to be followed in a suit
based on that consent. Instead, the Court announced a broad rule. It
held that, inasmuch as a state’s consent to suit is voluntary, the state
“may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be
sued, and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted, and may
withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that justice to the pub113
lic requires it.” The state’s consent to be sued was not, the Court
held, a contract subject to the Contracts Clause.114
The consent cases thus reflect a strongly pro-state rule. A state
could consent to suit, or not, as it pleased; it could attach such conditions to its consent as it thought appropriate; and it could withdraw its
consent even after a suit against it had commenced.
2. Waiver Cases. Simultaneously with these consent cases, however, the Supreme Court decided cases evincing a quite different tradition regarding waiver of a state’s immunity from suit without consent. Unlike consent, such waiver did not have to occur expressly. It
could arise by implication, and it could occur without regard to the intent of the state or its officials. Moreover, a state’s waiver of sover115
eign immunity was irrevocable.

[I never meet a Pennsylvanian at a London dinner] without feeling a disposition to
seize and divide him—to allot his beaver to one sufferer and his coat to another—to
appropriate his pocket-handkerchief to the orphan, and to comfort the widow with
his silver watch, Broadway rings, and the London Guide, which he always carries in
his pockets. How such a man can set himself down at an English table without feeling
that he owes two or three pounds to every man in company, I am at a loss to conceive.
HESKETH PEARSON, THE SMITH OF SMITHS: BEING THE LIFE, WIT AND HUMOUR OF SYDNEY
SMITH 268 (1977).
111. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 529.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 529–30.
115. See infra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
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The waiver cases began, as noted earlier, with Clark v. Bar116
nard, in which Rhode Island’s claim to money in the possession of a
federal district court was held to constitute a waiver of any objection
117
to the court’s power to determine that claim. Clark was a somewhat
unusual case in that the state appeared not solely in the character of a
defendant, but also as a party that had made an affirmative claim to a
fund that was in a federal court’s possession.118 The Court might
therefore have chosen to write a narrow opinion in Clark, establishing
nothing more than the principle that when a state affirmatively invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court, it necessarily consents to the
court’s determination of the claim that the state has brought to it.
Such a rule has, indeed, persisted in the bankruptcy area, where a
state’s filing of a proof of claim acts as a waiver of any objection to
the federal courts’ ability to rule on that claim, even if the ruling goes
against the state.119
Notably, however, the Clark opinion contained broad language
regarding waiver that would support a more general rule. The Court
said:
The immunity from suit belonging to a State, which is respected and
protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial power
of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may waive at
pleasure; so that in a suit, otherwise well brought, in which a State
had sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party defendant, its
appearance in a court of the United States would be a voluntary
120
submission to its jurisdiction . . . .

Notwithstanding the particular circumstances presented by Clark, this
language—directed specifically at cases in which a state’s interest was
as a defendant—suggested that the Court believed that a state waives
its immunity not only by affirmatively invoking the jurisdiction of a
federal court, but also by merely appearing in federal court in a case
in which it has been summoned as an ordinary defendant.
Subsequent cases confirmed the rule implied by Clark’s broad
121
language. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. concerned a

116. 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
117. Id. at 447–48.
118. Id. at 447.
119. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573–75 (1947).
120. Clark, 108 U.S. at 447.
121. 200 U.S. 273 (1906).
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122
tax exemption granted to a railroad by South Carolina. After the
railroad and its successors had enjoyed the exemption for thirteen
years, the state passed a new tax law, pursuant to which the treasurers
of two counties within the state started taxing the railroad’s property.123 The railroad sued the treasurers and claimed that the new law
impaired the obligations of a contract between the state and the rail124
road company. The treasurers were represented in this litigation by
the state attorney general.125 No issue of immunity was, apparently,
raised in this litigation, which proceeded to the United States Su126
preme Court and was resolved in favor of the railroad.
Another twenty-five years passed, after which the state at127
tempted once again to tax the railroad. In subsequent litigation, the
Supreme Court decided that the state was effectively a party to, and
was therefore bound by the judgment in, the first case.128 Although
noting that private parties may not sue a state without its consent, the
Court observed that:

Although a State may not be sued without its consent, such immunity is a privilege which may be waived, and hence where a State
voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby and cannot escape the
result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the
129
Eleventh Amendment.

The Gunter case made several noteworthy points. First, the
Court distinguished a state’s consent to be sued from the subtly different concept of the state’s waiver of its immunity from suit without
consent. The Court had jealously guarded the states’ right to limit the
130
former, but here it said that the latter may occur when a state simply
“voluntarily becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination.”131 Moreover, the Court held such a waiver to be
irrevocable: the state could not later invoke its immunity to “escape

122. Id. at 277.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 278.
125. Id.
126. Humphrey v. Pegues, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 244, 249 (1872).
127. Gunter, 200 U.S. at 279.
128. Id. at 289
129. Id. at 284 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)).
130. See supra Part II.A.1.
131. Gunter, 200 U.S. at 284.
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132
the result of its own voluntary act.” The Court determined that the
state attorney general, by virtue of his authority to litigate on behalf
of the state, could effectively bind the state and waive the state’s immunity by failing to assert it in the initial litigation.133 Finally, and
most important, Gunter extended the rule of Clark to the situation in
which the state was an ordinary defendant and not the party invoking
federal jurisdiction; even in such a case, the state’s voluntary appearance would constitute a waiver of its immunity. Thus, although Gunter was another slightly peculiar case (because immunity was waived
in the first, separate suit), it applied a broad rule that states waive
their immunity by simply failing to assert it.
Further developments confirmed the broad rule of waiver. Porto
134
Rico v. Ramos was a somewhat tangled case concerning title to real
property. The plaintiff, Ramos, claiming to be the owner of certain
real property, sued Eduardo Wood, who was holding the property as
an estate administrator.135 Because Wood was an alien, Ramos sued in
136
federal district court. Wood asserted that the property had escheated to Puerto Rico.137
Puerto Rico then appeared by its attorney general and sought
time to determine whether it should be made a party defendant in the
138
case. The case was continued, after which Puerto Rico again ap139
peared and claimed an interest in the action. The district court ordered Puerto Rico to be made a party defendant, and Ramos
amended his complaint accordingly.140 Puerto Rico then, however,
141
demurred to the complaint on the ground of sovereign immunity.
142
The demurrer was overruled, and Ramos won at trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed.143 Puerto Rico, it noted, was not
the defendant in the beginning; it had voluntarily petitioned to be

132. Id.
133. Id. at 288.
134. 232 U.S. 627 (1914).
135. Id. at 628.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 628–29.
138. Id. at 629.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 630.
142. Id. at 630–31.
143. Id. at 633.
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made a defendant. The attorney general had taken time to consider
this action, and had decided to intervene so as to be better able to
145
look after Puerto Rico’s interests in the litigation. Having done so,
Puerto Rico had consented to be a party to the case.146 Moreover, its
consent was irrevocable. The Court explained, “the immunity of sovereignty from suit without its consent cannot be carried so far as to
permit it to reverse the action invoked by it, and to come in and go
out of court at its will, the other party having no right of resistance to
either step.”147
Like Clark, Ramos shows the willingness of the Supreme Court
to hold sovereign defendants to the consequences of their own litigation decisions. Puerto Rico challenged the court’s jurisdiction immediately upon being made a defendant; nonetheless, the Court held
that it could not first ask to be made a defendant and then challenge
the court’s power over it. The case also evinces judicial concern for
the interests of the private plaintiff. By observing that the sovereign
cannot “come in and go out of court at its will, the other party having
no right of resistance to either step,” the Court suggests that, notwithstanding the sovereign character of the defendant, some regard must
be given to the interests of the other party.
Although Ramos is yet another slightly unusual case in that the
sovereign defendant itself sought to be made a party to the suit, the
case represents an extension beyond Clark, because in Ramos, the
sovereign intervened as a defendant, not as a claimant to a fund in the
possession of the court. Moreover, Ramos continued the pattern of
Clark and Gunter in that its language and reasoning were broad. The
Court stated a strong pro-plaintiff rule that, without reference to the
particular circumstances of the case, constricted the ability of sovereign defendants to assert sovereign immunity.
Moreover, once again, further developments showed the Court
giving full effect to the broad language employed in the previous
cases. The starkest example of this period’s jurisprudence came in
148
Richardson v. Fajardo Sugar Co., decided in 1916. In Richardson,
the plaintiff, a corporation, sought a refund of an allegedly unlawful

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 632.
Id.
241 U.S. 44 (1916).
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tax, which it had paid under protest to the treasurer of Puerto Rico.
The plaintiff sued the treasurer in federal court.150 The treasurer answered the plaintiff’s complaint, and some other steps were also
taken: the parties fixed a day for trial by stipulation, and the plaintiff
filed an amended and supplemental complaint, which the defendant
151
answered. Then, eight months after the action was first instituted,
the defendant moved for dismissal on the ground of sovereign immunity.152
The Supreme Court briskly denied the defendant’s assertion of
immunity as untimely. Citing Ramos and Gunter, the Court simply
said: “Whatever might have been the merit of [defendant’s] position
if promptly asserted and adhered to, we hold . . . that having solemnly
appeared and taken the other steps above narrated, [defendant] could
153
not thereafter deny the court’s jurisdiction.” The Court did not appear to believe that the case required any lengthy discussion.
Richardson unequivocally evinces a strongly pro-plaintiff rule of
waiver. The case is simple and straightforward. It shows that, unlike
the rules regarding consent to suit, the traditional rule regarding
waivers of sovereign immunity strongly favored plaintiffs.
The defendant in Richardson appeared in the ordinary character
of a defendant; he was not the one invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction. The defendant never expressly waived immunity or consented to suit. The waiver of immunity arose only implicitly, from the
defendant’s failure to assert immunity at the proper time. Moreover,
the defendant did not wait very long before attempting to assert immunity. The assertion was made while the case was still in trial court
and was, indeed, only a few months old and still in its pretrial stages.
Notwithstanding all of these points, the Supreme Court held that the
defendant had waited too long and that his implicit waiver of immu154
nity from suit was binding.
149. Id. at 46–47.
150. Id. at 44, 47.
151. Id. at 47.
152. Id.
153. Id. (citations omitted).
154. One detail remains: in Richardson, and in Ramos as well, the defendant was Puerto
Rico, which is a United States territory, not a state. Several indications, however, show that the
cases provide the rule that would have applied to state defendants in the same period. Most importantly, the Court’s opinions in the two cases make no reference to the territorial status of
Puerto Rico. The opinions appear to treat the cases as involving general rules of sovereign immunity that would apply equally to the case of a state defendant. Moreover, a year before Ramos, the Court had expressly stated that Puerto Rico “is of such nature as to come within the
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Considered together, the Supreme Court’s early cases on waiver
of state sovereign immunity reflected a very different, and much more
pro-plaintiff, rule than its cases regarding state consent to suit. Even
where a state never consented to suit, it could be held to have waived
its immunity from suit without consent. Such waivers could arise implicitly from a state’s conduct, including its mere failure to assert its
immunity at the proper time. A state could be bound by the actions of
its litigation counsel. Finally, a state’s waiver of its immunity, once
made in litigation, was irrevocable. These principles persisted until
155
1945.
B. Waiver Doctrine Constricted
The year 1945 witnessed a marked shift in the Supreme Court’s
approach to waiver issues, which occurred in the case of Ford Motor
Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana.156 Ford Motor Co. was in
form quite similar to the Richardson case just discussed: it was an action brought in federal court to recover an allegedly illegal tax collected by state officials.157 The defendants were the state’s Department of the Treasury and three officials who together constituted the
158
department’s board. The defendants, represented by the state’s attorney general, defended the case on its merits throughout proceedings in the trial and appellate courts. They made no mention of the issue of sovereign immunity in either court.159 When the case reached
general rule exempting a government sovereign in its attributes from being sued without its consent.” Porto Rico v. Rosaly, 227 U.S. 270, 273 (1913). This statement suggests that the rules for
suits against Puerto Rico would be the same as those for cases against state sovereigns. The
Court cited this case in Richardson, 241 U.S. at 47, so it had not forgotten about it. Similarly,
Puerto Rico is today treated as a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See P.R. Aqueduct
& Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141–42 n.1 (1993) (assuming this point
arguendo); Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment applies to Puerto Rico in all aspects). Finally, in Richardson, the Court relied
upon Gunter, a case involving a state defendant. 241 U.S. at 47; see supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. The fair inference from all these indications is that the holdings of Richardson
and Ramos would apply to state defendants.
155. See Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Before
1945, it was generally acknowledged that a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by
litigating a case on the merits without timely objecting to the federal court’s assertion of jurisdiction.”), amended by 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000); The Sao Vicente v. Transportes Maritimos
do Estado, 281 F. 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1922) (“The underlying principle of Clark v. Barnard has
been consistently followed.”), cert. dismissed, 260 U.S. 151 (1922).
156. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
157. Id. at 460–61.
158. Id. at 460.
159. Id. at 466–67.
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the Supreme Court, however, the defendants, for the first time, as160
serted that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff’s suit. Possibly
the defendant’s tardiness resulted from another shift in the Supreme
Court’s sovereign immunity doctrines: it was only a year earlier, in
the case of Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,161 that the Supreme Court had ruled that an action against state officials seeking a
refund of wrongfully collected taxes constituted a suit against the
state itself subject to the defense of sovereign immunity, rather than
162
an action against officials subject to the rule of Ex parte Young.
Therefore, it might not have occurred to the defendants to assert immunity from suit until after the appellate proceedings were already
163
concluded. In any event, the defendants did not raise their immunity until the case reached the last possible court.
The Supreme Court made several important rulings in favor of
the defendants. First, it reiterated its holding from Read, that the suit,
although naming individual defendants, was effectively a suit against
the state of Indiana and subject to the rules of state sovereign immu164
nity. Second, the Court, relying on its earlier decision in Reeves,
held that the state had not consented to be sued in federal court, even
though a state statute authorized a refund action against the state
treasury department “in any court of competent jurisdiction.”165 The
Court held that the statute evinced the state’s consent only to suits in
166
the state’s own courts.
Finally, the Supreme Court determined that the defendants’ as167
sertion of immunity “was in time.” The defendants added a new
wrinkle to the issue of waivers of state sovereign immunity: the issue
of state law authority. Defense counsel conceded that their failure to
assert immunity from suit in the lower courts constituted a waiver of
immunity, but only if they were authorized by state law to make such

160. Id. at 467.
161. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
162. Id. at 53.
163. The Read decision did not come until one month after Indiana had already prevailed in
the court of appeals on the merits of Ford’s suit against it. Id. at 47; Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 141 F.2d 24, 24, 26 (7th Cir. 1944).
164. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 462–63.
165. Id. at 465–66 (quoting BURNS, IND. STAT. ANN. § 64-2602 (1943 Replacement)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 467.
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168
a waiver. They claimed that under the relevant state law they were
not competent to waive the state’s sovereign immunity.169
The Supreme Court agreed. The Constitution of Indiana, the
Court observed, provided that the state legislature might generally
waive immunity for a class of cases, but expressly forbade it to waive
immunity in a particular case or to pay damages to a particular claim170
ant. From this provision, the Court inferred that the legislature
would not, except by clear language, confer discretion on state executive or administrative officials to waive immunity in a particular
case.171 Although the state attorney general was generally authorized
to represent the state in litigation, the state supreme court had construed his powers strictly and had held that he did not have the broad
authority of an attorney general at common law.172 Accordingly, the
Court held that the defendants could not have effected a waiver of
173
the state’s sovereign immunity.
The Court’s holding represented a considerable departure from
the waiver cases discussed in Part II.A.2. In none of the previous
cases had the Court demanded that, before a court could find that a
state had waived its sovereign immunity from suit, the court first inquire into the authority of the state’s attorneys to waive immunity as
a matter of state law. To the contrary, in Gunter, the Court had held
that the state attorney general’s appearance had waived the state’s
sovereign immunity based simply on his general authority under state
law to represent the state in litigation.174 In Ford Motor Co., the Court
said that in Gunter, the state’s submission to the court was authorized
175
by state statute, not by the unauthorized consent of an official. This
argument, however, hardly seems like a persuasive distinction, inasmuch as the attorney general’s authority in both cases was simply the
authority to represent the state in litigation. In one case this was held
to be sufficient to bind the state to a waiver of immunity; in the other,

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 468.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 468–69.
173. Id. at 469–70.
174. Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 288 (1906).
175. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 469–70.

SIEGEL.DOC

2003]

10/10/03 9:38 AM

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1199

176
it was not. The Court also dismissed Richardson with the cryptic observation that in that case “without consideration of any limitations
on his powers, we held that the attorney general of Puerto Rico could
waive its sovereign immunity.”177 The Court’s statement acknowledges that it had previously recognized a waiver of sovereign immunity based on the mere failure of counsel to assert the immunity seasonably.
Ford Motor Co. thus tightened waiver doctrine considerably. A
state’s counsel’s inadvertent—or even, apparently, advertent—failure
to raise immunity could not waive state sovereign immunity unless
state law authorized the counsel to waive. Most state attorneys general have, of course, the power to represent the state in litigation, but
few if any have express statutory authority to waive the state’s sover178
eign immunity from suit.

176. The Court also suggested that Gunter had turned on res judicata principles. Id. This
suggestion at least had the merit of pointing to a real distinction between Gunter and Ford Motor Co., although it was not consistent with the broad waiver language used in Gunter.
177. Id. at 469 n.14.
178. See, e.g., id. at 468:
[None] of the general or specific powers conferred by statute on the Indiana attorney
general to appear and defend actions brought against the state or its officials can be
deemed to confer on that officer power to consent to suit against the state in courts
when the state has not consented to be sued.
See also Montgomery v. Maryland, 266 F.3d 334, 399 (4th Cir. 2001) (“‘[T]he Attorney General
of Maryland lacks the authority to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity on behalf of the state
and its officials.’” (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 145 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997))), vacated,
122 S. Ct. 1958 (2002); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 251 F.3d 1372, 1375 (11th
Cir. 2001) (concluding that “the Attorney General of the State of Georgia lacks the statutory
authority to waive the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity”), rev’d on other grounds, 535
U.S. 613, 624 (2002); Santee Sioux Tribe v. Nebraska, 121 F.3d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The
Tribe has failed to demonstrate that waiver of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity is
within the authority of Nebraska’s attorney general.”); Estate of Porter v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684,
691 (7th Cir. 1994) (“As Illinois law now stands, the Attorney General is not authorized to
waive Illinois’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); Dagnall v. Gegenheimer, 645 F.2d 2, 3 (5th
Cir. 1981) (“Louisiana law does not clearly give attorneys for the State authority to waive its
eleventh amendment immunity.”); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974) (Weick, J.,
concurring) (“The Attorney General of Ohio had no power or authority to waive sovereign immunity of either the State or its officers and agent . . . .”), vacated, 421 U.S. 982, 982–83 (1975);
Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 11 Cal. Rptr. 15, 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (“At bar there was no
evidence that any authority had been conferred on the attorney general to waive the state’s
right of immunity.”); Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Great Southwest Warehouses, Inc., 352 S.W.2d 493,
495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (noting that the Texas Attorney General is “without legal power or
authority to waive the right of the State to immunity”). But see ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020(c)
(Michie 2002) (giving Alaska’s Attorney General power, expiring January 1, 1999, to waive the
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity in a very limited class of cases).
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Moreover, the Court expanded the holding of Ford Motor Co.
179
even further with its later decision in Edelman v. Jordan. The case is
known principally for its holding that the “officer suit fiction” of Ex
parte Young is limited to cases in which the plaintiff seeks prospective, injunctive relief and cannot be applied to cases seeking retroac180
tive monetary damages. The case also, however, almost casually, effected a significant extension of Ford Motor Co.
Edelman was a class action challenge to the administration of the
181
Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled (AABD) program by Illinois.
Like many welfare programs, AABD was a combined federal-state
program that was administered largely by state officials and partially
182
funded by the federal government. Plaintiffs sued the state officials
administering the program in Illinois and asserted that the state’s implementation of the program violated federal law in various respects.183 The district court agreed with the plaintiffs. It ordered the
defendants to administer the program properly in the future and to
184
pay benefits it had wrongfully denied in the past.
On appeal, the defendants, for the first time, asserted sovereign
185
immunity from suit. The Supreme Court held that the defendants
could raise immunity on appeal for the first time.186 Quoting Ford
Motor Co., the Court simply observed that “it has been well settled
since the decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, . . .
that the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial
court.”187
As the above discussion suggests, the Court’s statement is not a
fully accurate rendering of Ford Motor Co. It is true that, in Ford
Motor Co., the Court made the following broad statement: “The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this
Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this

179. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
180. Id. at 664–71.
181. Id. at 653.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 656.
185. Id. at 657–58, 677.
186. Id. at 677–78.
187. Id.
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188
case even though urged for the first time in this Court.” This statement was, however, immediately followed by the Court’s discussion
of whether the state’s counsel had waived the issue of immunity by
failing to raise it in the lower courts and its determination that they
had not because they lacked authority to effect such a waiver.189 The
Court’s discussion suggests that Ford Motor Co. cannot fairly be read
to impose the flat rule that a state is always free to assert its sovereign
immunity on appeal for the first time. Rather, Ford Motor Co. held
that a state may still raise immunity in an appellate court despite its
counsel’s failure to raise the issue below if that counsel lacked
authority under state law to waive the state’s sovereign immunity.
Such a rule is, to be sure, already quite generous to state defendants,
but Edelman took the rule even further by apparently holding that a
state is always free to raise immunity on appeal after having remained
silent on the issue in a trial court, without regard to the issue of state
counsel’s authority.
Edelman’s broad statement did not prove that states have an absolutely unlimited power to raise sovereign immunity at any time.
The case was one in which there was apparently no consideration of
sovereign immunity, either way, in the district court. So the case did
not clearly determine what would happen if, for example, a state’s
counsel expressly and affirmatively waived sovereign immunity in
trial court, only to reassert it on appeal. Still, Edelman certainly suggested a very broad power on the part of states to raise immunity issues belatedly, and subsequent cases sometimes stated that, because
state sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional defense, states can assert
it “at any point in a proceeding.”190
Indeed, a few years later, in Patsy v. Board of Regents of the State
191
of Florida, the Supreme Court applied Edelman’s rule very broadly.
The case is best known for its holding that plaintiffs bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not obliged to exhaust state law
remedies first.192 The parties had argued the case as an exhaustion
case; the state defendants, although invited by the Court to do so,
raised no immunity defense and urged the Court to decide the case

188. 323 U.S. at 467.
189. Id. at 467–69.
190. E.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.8 (1984); Crosetto
v. State Bar, 12 F.3d 1396, 1402 n.10 (7th Cir. 1993); Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th
Cir. 1984).
191. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
192. Id. at 516.
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193
solely on the exhaustion issue. Still, in its opinion the Court stated
in a footnote that the defendant remained free to raise Eleventh
Amendment immunity even after the Supreme Court decided the
case. The defendant could, the Court said, raise immunity on remand.194
Thus, the post-1945 cases presented a very different view of the
waiver issue. Whereas the Court in Richardson unhesitatingly found a
waiver in the state’s counsel’s mere failure to raise the defense of immunity promptly upon being sued, the post-1945 cases demanded an
inquiry into counsel’s authority to waive immunity. Moreover, possibly without regard to the issue of authority, the post-1945 cases sanctioned the raising of immunity very late in litigation—even in, or after, a case comes to the Supreme Court.

C. Constructive Consent—Comeback and Decline
Notwithstanding the post-1945 conflation of the concepts of state
consent to suit and state waiver of immunity from suit (with the concomitant tightening of the latter), the 1960s witnessed a revival of a
pro-plaintiff attitude as the Supreme Court invoked the theory of
“constructive consent” to suit. The Court applied this important—if
short-lived—theory to cases different from either kind of case discussed so far. In the consent cases discussed above, a state voluntarily
and intentionally agreed to be sued. In the waiver cases, the actions of
state officers had the effect of waiving state immunity from suit
whether anyone intended it or not. The waiver cases discussed so far,
however, all concerned actions taken by state officers in the course of
individual litigation.195 In the 1960s, the Court confronted cases in
which a state was said to have relinquished its immunity by taking actions outside the litigation context—specifically, by engaging in con193. Id. at 515 n.19. Actually, there was some dispute among the Justices as to whether the
defendant had raised an Eleventh Amendment defense or not. It appears that the defendant
had not raised immunity in the district court; it had raised the issue in the court of appeals, but
that court failed to rule on the issue. Id. The defendant then mentioned the issue in its reply to
the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari, but did not argue the issue in its brief on the merits in the
Supreme Court. Id. In response to questions at oral argument, the defendant stated that it did
not pursue the immunity issue in its merits brief in light of the Court’s grant of certiorari and
that it wanted the Court to decide the exhaustion question. Id.; id. at 520–25 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court understood the defendant as not pressing the immunity issue, id. at 515
n.19, but dissenting Justices did not agree with that assessment, id. at 524–25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 515 n.19.
195. See supra Part II.A.2–II.B.
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duct regulated by federal law. It was in these cases that the Court deployed the doctrine of constructive consent.
The Court created the constructive consent doctrine in the case
196
of Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks Department.
Parden, a railroad employee, was injured on the job and brought suit
against his employer under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act
(FELA).197 Because the railroad was a state entity, the lower courts
198
dismissed Parden’s suit. The Supreme Court, however, reinstated
199
it.
FELA, the Court observed, clearly provides that “every common
carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the
several States . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
200
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce.” By
operating an interstate railroad after passage of the FELA, the Court
held, the state “necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized
by that Act.”201 That is, the state had not made an actual, “altogether
voluntary” consent to suit, as would have been required by the
Court’s traditional consent cases.202 Rather, the state’s “consent” was
a constructive consent imposed on it as a matter of federal law by vir203
tue of its conduct.

196. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
197. Id. at 184–85.
198. Id. at 185.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 185–86 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2000)).
201. Id. at 192.
202. See supra Part II.A.1.
203. The Court has actually referred to Parden as creating a doctrine of constructive waiver.
E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 737 (1999). Inasmuch, however, as Part II.A.2 showed that
waiver of sovereign immunity is simply the legal consequence of certain actions taken by state
officials without regard to their intent, there could hardly be a need for a doctrine of constructive waiver. If the actions taken by states in cases such as Parden were such as to give rise to a
waiver of state sovereign immunity, the waiver would be a real waiver, not a constructive one.
Indeed, the Court might have treated Parden as a waiver case; it could have held that a state’s
engaging in federally regulated conduct waived the state’s sovereign immunity without regard to
the state’s intent. Probably the Court chose not to use such a theory because it would have been
inconsistent with the Court’s tightening of waiver doctrine in cases such as Ford Motor Co. Instead, therefore, the Court said that states, by engaging in certain federally regulated conduct,
have “necessarily consented” to suit on matters arising out of that conduct. That fiction brought
the case within a recognized category of cases in which state sovereign immunity could be
avoided. Because the state did not actually intend such consent, the term “constructive consent”
properly describes the fictional consent invoked by the Court.
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Notably, although four Justices dissented, the dissenting opinion questioned only whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation,
205
FELA should be understood to impose liability on state railroads.
The dissenting opinion expressly agreed that “it is within the power of
Congress to condition a State’s permit to engage in the interstate
transportation business on a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity
from suits arising out of such business.”206 The only question was
whether Congress had expressed its intent to do so by a sufficiently
207
clear statement. Thus, all nine Justices accepted the concept of constructive consent.
Subsequently, however, the Court first limited, and then ultimately overruled, Parden. First, in a series of cases, the Court
adopted the stance of the Parden dissenters and determined that any
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity must be accomplished by clear statutory language—indeed, as the Court ulti208
mately held, by “unmistakably” clear statutory language. The mere
use of a generic phrase that could describe private and state actors
equally (such as “every common carrier by railroad”) would not suffice.209
Even more significantly, the Court later overruled the very concept of constructive consent by mere participation in federally regu210
lated activity. The cases just mentioned governed only the standard
of clarity by which Congress must act before courts will find that
states have constructively consented to suit, an issue that seems
clearly distinct from the issue of whether Congress can provide for
constructive consent at all (as to which all nine Justices agreed in
Parden). Nonetheless, the Court subsequently determined that it had
“narrowed” and “severely undermined” Parden,211 and in ultimately
overruling it, said that it was overruling “[w]hatever may remain of

204. Parden, 377 U.S. at 198 (White, J., dissenting).
205. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 198–200 (White, J., dissenting).
208. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 246 (1985); Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health
& Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284–85 (1973).
209. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 231; Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 246; Employees of the Dep’t of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 284–85.
210. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680
(1999).
211. Id. at 680, 689.
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212
our decision in Parden” —as though there were some question
whether anything remained at all. In any event, the Court determined
that “express waiver of sovereign immunity [must] be unequivocal”
and could not arise constructively from the state’s mere participation
in federally regulated activity.213 Indeed, the Court hinted, if it did not
actually say, that even express consent by the states, if wrongfully exacted, might not be sufficient: although Congress, the Court appeared
to say, may condition a state’s receipt of a federal “gift or gratuity” on
the state’s consent to be sued, the opinion left some doubt whether
Congress could require a state to consent to suit before the state can
engage in “otherwise permissible activity.”214 And certainly, the
Parden concept of constructive consent by mere participation in federally regulated activity is gone.

D. The Ideology of Waiver Doctrine
What inspired the marked shift in the Court’s doctrine regarding
waivers of state sovereign immunity? As discussed in Part II.A.2,
prior to 1945, the Supreme Court’s cases recognized a rather generous, pro-plaintiff set of rules by which courts could determine that
states had waived their sovereign immunity. Ford Motor Co. and subsequent cases took a significantly different approach, greatly narrowing, almost to the point of nonexistence, the possibility of a state’s
waiving its immunity from a particular suit against it in federal court.
One possibility—a possibility never to be neglected in any human endeavor—is that the Court slipped into its new doctrine
through error. The Court may have inadvertently conflated its previously separate lines of cases regarding state consent to suit and waiver
of a state’s immunity from suit without consent. As discussed above,
prior to 1945, the Court maintained quite different rules in these different kinds of cases. Ford Motor Co. and subsequent decisions could
simply reflect a failure to appreciate the distinction between these
two lines of authority.
Some language in Court opinions does suggest casual thinking on
this issue. For example, a decade after Ford Motor Co., the Supreme
215
Court, in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, remarked
that state sovereign immunity “is an immunity which a State may
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 680.
Id.
Id. at 686–87.
359 U.S. 275 (1959).
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waive at its pleasure . . . as by a general appearance in litigation in a
federal court . . . or by statute. The conclusion that there has been a
216
waiver of immunity will not be lightly inferred.” The Court here
puts together one rule from the waiver cases (waiver by general appearance) with another rule from the consent cases (consent by statute), and then, apparently, subjects both to the principle that waiver
of immunity will not be lightly inferred. Prior to 1945, that principle
was applicable only to consent cases, not to waiver cases.
The slip in Petty was, at most, a venial one, because the case was
217
in fact about consent, not waiver. Application of the stringent test
was, therefore, correct for the case at hand. Any implication that the
stringent test would also apply in a case that was about waiver was
really just dictum.218
More seriously, however, courts have also, without much apparent thought, conflated the waiver and consent cases in the context of
cases that are about waiver. The Supreme Court’s most notable in219
stance of such conflation occurred in College Savings Bank, the case
in which it overruled Parden’s doctrine of constructive waiver.220 The
Court, speaking through Justice Scalia, had this to say:
We have long recognized that a State’s sovereign immunity is “a
personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure.” Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S., at 447. The decision to waive that immunity, however, “is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty.” Beers
v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858). Accordingly, our “test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-

216. Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
217. The case considered whether two states had consented to suit against a bi-state commission created by a compact between the two states that was approved by Congress in accordance with the Constitution’s Compacts Clause. Id. at 277–79; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3
(“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State . . . .”).
218. Moreover, notwithstanding anything the Court said about not lightly inferring waiver, it
did in fact find waiver on arguably rather slim grounds: it determined that the compact’s provision that the bi-state entity could “sue and be sued” was sufficient to waive its immunity, in light
of a congressional proviso that the compact was not to impair federal authority over interstate
commerce. See id. at 279–83 (discussing how any doubt as to the provision’s meaning disappeared when Congress’s acceptance was conditioned on the reservation of all federal right,
power, and jurisdiction).
219. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
220. Id. at 680.
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court jurisdiction is a stringent one.” Atascadero State Hospital v.
221
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).

Each sentence quoted here is independently unimpeachable. Together, however, they constitute the same solecism that occurred in
Petty. The first sentence quotes Clark’s recognition of a state’s ability
to waive its immunity from suit. The second sentence, however, relies
on Beers, a case from the other line of authority—the line of cases
concerning consent, not waiver.222 The third sentence then ties the two
together and suggests that the stringent rules applied in the consent
cases should apply to waiver cases as well. Thus, even though the issue was whether the state’s actions amounted to waiver whether the
state liked it or not, the Court held that there could be no waiver, because there was not a sufficiently “clear declaration” by the state that
it had made an “‘altogether voluntary’ decision to waive its immunity.”223
Similar conflation is also common in the lower courts. For example, the Fourth Circuit case of In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washing224
ton, D.C., Inc. raised the issue of whether a state waives its immunity by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy.225 In discussing this issue,
the court noted that “the Supreme Court has consistently held that ‘a
State will be deemed to have waived its immunity only where [the
waiver is] stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as will leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.’”226 The quoted language is from, and
is appropriate to, consent cases; the Fourth Circuit incorrectly applied
it to waiver cases.
The very language that the Fourth Circuit quoted should have
alerted the court that something was wrong. The quoted language
says that a state may waive its immunity only by “the most express
language” or by “overwhelming implication from the text.” This test,
appropriately applied in examining the text of state statutes that pur221. Id. at 675.
222. The point here is not to criticize the Court for using the word “waiver” to describe both
contexts; the separate meaning for “consent” and “waiver,” suggested in this Article, is not a
standard usage. The problem is the failure to recognize the substantive difference between the
previously distinct lines of authority governing consent cases and waiver cases.
223. Id. at 680–81 (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858)).
224. 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
225. Id. at 1143.
226. Id. at 1147 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239–40 (1985))
(alteration in original).
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portedly consent to suit, can have no application to the question
whether a state waives its immunity by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy. In such a case there is no “language” or “text” to consider.
The state takes a particular action—namely, filing a proof of claim—
and the question is whether that action, not any text that the state has
promulgated, constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit determined in Creative Goldsmiths
that filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy constitutes a waiver of the
state’s immunity from any claim by the debtor that is a compulsory
227
counterclaim to the state’s claim. The court reached this conclusion
not by examining any state language or text, but by considering “the
fundamental fairness of judicial process,” which requires a court considering the state’s claim to consider the defendant’s defenses, in228
cluding compulsory counterclaims. So, even having stated the stringent test from the other line of cases, the Fourth Circuit did not really
apply it; the court must have sensed that the test was inappropriate to
the case at hand, even though it did not clearly explain what it was
doing.229
Thus, it is certainly possible that the conflation of the consent
and waiver cases has come about simply through error and through a
227. In re Creative Goldsmiths, 119 F.3d at 1148.
228. See id. (“[I]t would violate the fundamental fairness of judicial process to allow a state
to proceed in federal court and at the same time strip the defendant of valid defenses because
they might be construed to be affirmative claims against the state.”).
229. For another, similar decision, see Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 270
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2001). As in the cases cited in the text, the Court began by citing the rule of
Clark, that state sovereign immunity is a personal privilege which a state may waive at pleasure,
but then it applied the rule from the consent cases, that because such waiver is altogether voluntary, the court must apply a stringent test for waiver. Id. at 24. Yet the court went on to hold
that a state’s filing of a proof in bankruptcy waives immunity from compulsory counterclaims,
even if the counterclaims exceed the value of the state’s claim. Id. at 29. Again, the court cannot
really be applying the stringent test from the consent cases, under which, as Part II.A.1 discusses, the state is free to attach conditions to its consent or even to withdraw its consent in midcourse.
The Seventh Circuit, in In re Friendship Medical Center, Ltd., 710 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir.
1983), similarly took the attitude that “[a] plaintiff bears a heavy burden in showing waiver,”
and that it could arise only by express language or overwhelming implication from the text of a
statute, id. at 1300, even though the action allegedly waiving immunity was again the filing of a
proof of claim in bankruptcy. Id.
For similar conflation in scholarly commentary, see Siegel, supra note 53, at 55–56 (discussing College Savings Bank in terms of consent, whereas it truly dealt with waiver). That was
written before I had thought carefully about the difference between consent and waiver. See
also Jennifer Cotner, Note, How the Spending Clause Can Solve the Dilemma of State Sovereign
Immunity from Intellectual Property Suits, 51 DUKE L.J. 713, 717 (2001) (referring to the stringent consent test while discussing waiver).
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failure to appreciate that the Court previously recognized these cases
as two distinct lines of authority. This explanation, however, seems
incomplete. It fails to account for a vital factor in state sovereign immunity cases: ideology.
Decisions in the sovereign immunity area do not come free of
judges’ ideological predispositions. As Justice Frankfurter remarked
230
in Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, “[t]he readiness or
reluctance with which courts find such consent has naturally been influenced by prevailing views regarding the moral sanction to be attributed to a State’s freedom from suability.”231 State sovereign immunity stands at the very center of highly charged debates about
federalism and states’ rights. In recent years it has “become the bulwark principle of federalism.”232 The issue of whether a state has consented to suit or otherwise waived its immunity from suit gets tied up
with ideological assumptions regarding the value of the immunity that
may have been waived.
As the Supreme Court decides cases and creates doctrines, some
matters become more ideological than others. Strange patterns
emerge in how strongly such ideologization affects decisionmaking.
Few issues, for example, could be more sensitive than the death penalty, as was attested by the practices of Justices who opposed it and
who noted their opposition in every death penalty case, even those in
233
which the Court denied certiorari. Yet, charged as the matter was,

230. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
231. Id. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
232. David J. Bederman, Admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
935, 937 (1996).
233. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall engaged in this practice for years in cases too
numerous to cite. See Jordan Steiker, The Long Road up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall
and the Death Penalty, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1131, 1132 (1993) (noting Justice Marshall’s dissents and
arguing for a new understanding of his position). According to Westlaw, they issued literally
thousands of such dissents. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Bowers, 501 U.S. 1282, 1282 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (setting forth Justice Marshall’s last summary dissent from the denial of certiorari in a death penalty case); Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (setting forth Justice Brennan’s last summary dissent from the denial of certiorari in a
death penalty case); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227–28 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(expressing the view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(same). Justice Blackmun began a similar practice shortly before his retirement from the Court
and had occasion to apply it to only about 160 cases. See Drew v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1266, 1266
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (setting forth Justice Blackmun’s last summary dissent from
the denial of certiorari in a death penalty case); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that the death penalty cannot be fairly applied).
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234
all the Justices were able to agree in Heckler v. Chaney that the
Food and Drug Administration had discretion not to enforce the
Food and Drug Act against state officials who executed convicted
criminals by lethal injection, even though such a practice probably
violated the act by using drugs for a non-approved purpose.235 Justice
Rehnquist, writing the Court’s opinion, noted expressly that

[t]he fact that the drugs involved in this case are ultimately to be
used in imposing the death penalty must not lead this Court or other
courts to import profound differences of opinion over the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution into the
236
domain of administrative law.

Other areas of law, however, seem to generate views that spill
over into tangentially related matters. For example, in Thornburgh v.
237
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Supreme
Court held provisions of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act uncon238
stitutional. The ruling came in an unusual posture: the district court
had passed only on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the act, based on a stipulation of facts that expressly reserved the parties’ ability to controvert the facts when the
case was later tried.239 The district court denied most of the requested
240
preliminary injunction. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the appellate role in such a case is normally “limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding the
presence or absence of irreparable harm and a probability that the
plaintiffs would succeed on the merits,”241 and although the defendants stated their intent to develop a complete factual record that
242
they believed could affect the disposition of the case, the Court decided the merits of the case and issued a final judgment holding provisions of the act unconstitutional.243 Justice O’Connor strongly protested: “Today’s decision . . . makes it painfully clear that no legal rule
234. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
235. Id. at 826–27; id. at 832 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 840–41 (Marshall, J., concurring
in the judgment).
236. Id. at 838. Justice Brennan agreed. Id. at 839 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
237. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
238. Id. at 772.
239. Id. at 752–53.
240. Id. at 753.
241. Id. at 755.
242. Id. at 826–27 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 772.
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or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of
244
abortion.”
Waiver doctrine appears to have experienced a similar ideological spillover from developments in the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity more generally. The conflation of consent and waiver cases
within Eleventh Amendment doctrine, the determination that state
counsel cannot waive state sovereign immunity unless authorized to
do so, and the determination that state sovereign immunity can be
raised on appeal for the first time, all had the effect of making waivers
of state sovereign immunity much harder to obtain. It cannot be an
accident that the post-1945 shift in the rules regarding waiver of state
sovereign immunity moved the doctrine even further in its primary
direction of protecting state’s rights; indeed, in each of the critical
cases, the constriction of waiver doctrine was a small matter compared to the expansion of the immunity held not to be waived. In
Ford Motor Co., the holding that state counsel could not waive state
sovereign immunity unless authorized to do so under state law accompanied the new judicial recognition that refund suits against state
245
tax collectors implicated state sovereign immunity in the first place.
Edelman v. Jordan expanded the procedural ability of states to assert
their immunity belatedly, even as it took the much larger substantive
step of expanding the underlying immunity to cover any suit against a
state officer seeking retrospective monetary damages.246
Nor can it be an accident that the short-lived doctrine of constructive consent emerged during the 1960s, the era of the Warren
247
Court. During that period, the Court tended to favor federal power
248
at the expense of state governments. It was only four years after

244. Id. at 814 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
245. See Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 462–70 (1945) (noting that because the suit was based on Indiana’s refund statute, it was an action against the state and sovereign immunity was implicated). As noted earlier, the Court had presaged this tightening of the
underlying immunity just a year earlier, in Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47 (1944). See supra Part II.B.
246. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664–65, 671, 678 (1974) (holding that suits against
officers where the judgment award would come from the general revenues of the state are similar enough to an award against the state itself to justify Eleventh Amendment protection).
247. See supra Part II.C.
248. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Restraint
to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 623 (2002) (noting that in 1958,
state chief justices issued a report condemning the Warren Court’s expansion of federal power
at the expense of the states).
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249
Parden, for example, that the Court held, in Maryland v. Wirtz, that
the federal government could compel states to pay their employees
250
the minimum wage.
Each of these movements suggests that the stringency of waiver
doctrine ebbed and flowed with the overall ideological tide of the
Eleventh Amendment. It might seem that the issue of waiver of state
sovereign immunity is a purely procedural matter upon which all
might agree despite differing views on the substantive scope of the
immunity itself. It appears, however, that ideological trends in Eleventh Amendment immunity overwhelmed the previously settled
251
scope of waiver doctrine. The waiver doctrine became ideologized.

E. The Countertrend
Perhaps surprisingly, in light of the Supreme Court’s current attitude of extreme stringency regarding state sovereign immunity generally, its most recent cases have created a countertrend within the doctrine of waivers. The Court, in two recent cases, explicitly overruled
Ford Motor Co., the most troublesome case from the post-1945 era,
and vitiated the rule, suggested by Edelman v. Jordan, that state sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional defense that a state may assert at

249. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
250. Id. at 195–97. This decision was, of course, overruled by National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1976), which was in turn overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
251. Professor David Bederman has documented a similar transformation of the law of state
sovereign immunity with regard to admiralty cases. Bederman, supra note 232. Professor
Bederman observes that one early case, United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232 (C.C.D. Pa.
1809), read the Eleventh Amendment as not applying to admiralty suits, because of the amendment’s limitation to cases in “law or equity.” Bederman, supra note 232, at 963–66. Even during
what Professor Bederman calls the “sovereign immunity revolution” of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, when the courts began to recognize state sovereign immunity from
admiralty actions, the courts still drew careful distinctions and preserved federal power over
some cases, particularly in rem admiralty actions brought against a res not in the actual possession of state officials, or not used for public purposes, even though a state might have an interest
in the res. Id. at 984–85. In the late twentieth century, however, admiralty cases got indiscriminately swept up in the rush of cases broadening state sovereign immunity. Courts began to hold
that state sovereign immunity bars an admiralty case, even an in rem case, if a state claims ownership of the res, even if the state does not possess the res and the claim of ownership is disputed. Id. at 985–1000. Just as this Article suggests that a more nuanced law regarding waivers is
consistent even with the broad, official theory of state sovereign immunity, Professor Bederman’s article suggests that, notwithstanding the general broadening of state sovereign immunity,
courts should respect the historic understanding that in rem admiralty actions, brought against a
res not actually possessed by state officials, or not used for public purposes, do not implicate
state sovereign immunity. Id. at 1005–07.
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any point in litigation. Some lower courts have concluded that the
Court has reinstated its pre-1945 rules with regard to waivers of state
252
sovereign immunity.
The countertrend began in 1998 with the case of Wisconsin De253
partment of Corrections v. Schacht, which concerned a state prison
guard who was fired for allegedly stealing state property.254 The prison
guard sued his former employer, the state department of corrections,
and several of its individual officials in state court for alleged violation of the federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause and federal civil
rights laws.255 The defendants removed the case to federal court. Once
there, the defendants successfully asserted that the Eleventh
Amendment barred suit against the Department itself and against the
individual defendants insofar as they were sued in their official ca256
pacities.
The removal of the case posed a jurisdictional puzzle: the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, permits removal of a case to federal
district court only if the district court has original jurisdiction over the
257
case. The defendants in Schacht, in removing the case to federal
court, necessarily asserted that the case was within the federal jurisdiction. This assertion seemed sound, because the suit arose under
federal law and so fell within the federal question jurisdiction con258
ferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The defendants, however, asserted sovereign immunity from suit once the case was in federal court.259 If sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional defense, the defendants’ assertion
of the defense amounted to a claim that the case was not within the
federal jurisdiction. If that was correct, then the case should not have
been removed to federal court. Because of this problem, the Seventh
Circuit, following the district court’s dismissal of the case on immu-

252. See, e.g., Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that the Court has “returned to its original understanding of Eleventh Amendment immunity”),
amended by 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000); Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619,
631 (10th Cir. 1998) (characterizing the Court as having held that “sovereign immunity is in the
nature of an affirmative defense that may be asserted or waived at a state’s discretion”).
253. 524 U.S. 381 (1998).
254. Id. at 383.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 384–85.
257. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
259. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 384.
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nity grounds, held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
260
case and should have remanded the case to state court.
The Supreme Court resolved the puzzle by determining that the
Eleventh Amendment “does not automatically destroy original juris261
diction.” Rather, the Court said, “the Eleventh Amendment grants
the State a legal power to assert a sovereign immunity defense should
it choose to do so. The State can waive the defense.”262 Furthermore,
the Court held, a federal district court is not obliged to raise the immunity defense sua sponte. The Court said, “[u]nless the State raises
the matter, a court can ignore it.”263 Accordingly, the Court held, the
264
district court properly exercised removal jurisdiction over the case.
Once the state asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity, the district
court was obliged to dismiss claims barred by that immunity, but it
could proceed to hear such claims as the case presented that were not
so barred.265
The determination, in Schacht, that state sovereign immunity does
not automatically destroy a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but
gives a state a defense that it may choose to raise or not, is inconsistent
with the post-1945 view, suggested by Edelman, that state sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional defense. Moreover, if the defense is not jurisdictional, the rule that a state may raise the defense at any time is under266
mined. Schacht’s statement that the defense is not jurisdictional and may
be waived by a state would logically seem to entail reinstatement of the
prior, traditional rule that the defense is waived if it is not seasonably asserted. Indeed, some lower courts concluded that Schacht had reinstated
that traditional rule.267
260. Id. at 385.
261. Id. at 389.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 386.
265. Id. at 392–93. The non-barred claims in the case were the claims against the individual
defendants in their individual capacities. Id. at 385–86.
266. See Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1999):
Once it is clear that the Eleventh Amendment is not a true limitation upon the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather a personal privilege that a state may waive, it is
difficult to justify or explain a rule that allows this defense to be invoked at any time
in the proceedings.
amended by 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000).
267. See In re SDDS, Inc., 225 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a state waives immunity by actively litigating a case’s merits without raising immunity); Hill, 179 F.3d at 760
(stating that the Court has “returned to its original understanding of Eleventh Amendment immunity” and holding that a state waives its immunity defense by failing to raise the defense until
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Moreover, a concurring opinion in Schacht explicitly considered,
and expressed concern about the fairness of, the Court’s post-1945
waiver doctrine. Justice Kennedy (who is usually one of the strongest
268
supporters of state sovereign immunity among all the Justices) expressed doubts as to the propriety of the rule permitting states to as269
sert sovereign immunity for the first time on appeal. Justice Kennedy noted that this rule confers an unfair advantage on states, and
he suggested that the Court could eliminate the unfairness by “modifying our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence to make it more consistent with our practice regarding personal jurisdiction.”270
The trend of Schacht continued, last Term, with the Supreme
Court’s unanimous determination that a state automatically waives its
Eleventh Amendment immunity, at least on some claims, by removing a case from state court to federal court. In Lapides v. Board of
271
Regents of the University System of Georgia, the plaintiff, a state
university professor, brought suit against his Board of Regents and
272
against individual university officials. He asserted that, by placing
allegations of sexual harassment in his personnel file, the defendants
had violated both state and federal law.273 The plaintiff sued in Georgia state court, and the parties agreed that a state statute waived the
state’s immunity from suit in state court on state law causes of action.274
The defendants removed the case to federal district court.275 The
individual defendants preferred the federal forum because federal
courts, but not Georgia state courts, permit interlocutory appeal of
the first day of trial); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a state waives immunity by removing a case to federal court).
268. This was most notably demonstrated in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261
(1997). Justice Kennedy’s opinion (joined, on this point, only by Chief Justice Rehnquist) suggested that, in applying the rule of Ex parte Young, courts should engage in a case-specific balancing of state and federal interests before deciding whether a private party may sue a state officer for prospective, injunctive relief under federal law. Id. at 270–80. Even Justices O’Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas (the other three Justices who support the official theory of state sovereign
immunity) did not approve this view and stated that it “unnecessarily recharacterizes and narrows much of our Young jurisprudence.” Id. at 291 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
269. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 393–94 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
270. Id. at 395.
271. 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
272. Id. at 616.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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276
adverse rulings on the defense of qualified immunity. The state itself agreed to join in seeking removal—as all defendants must, for
277
removal to be effective —in order to accommodate the individual
278
defendants. Once the case was removed, however, the state defendant asserted sovereign immunity from all of the plaintiff’s claims.279
The state asserted that, although it had waived immunity from suit on
state law claims in state court, it had not waived immunity from suit
on any claims in federal court.280 The district court held that the state
had waived its immunity by joining in the removal petition, but the
court of appeals reversed, noting that the authority of Georgia’s attorney general to waive the state’s immunity was doubtful as a matter
281
of state law.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court first observed that the plaintiff’s federal claims, based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
must fail against the state defendant, because, as the Court had previ282
ously held, states are not “persons” suable under § 1983. Thus, the
case was really limited to the plaintiff’s state law claims. Moreover,
the case was further limited, the Court held, by the state’s concession
that it would have had no immunity from those claims in the original,
283
state-court forum.
With the case thus limited, the Court held that the state had
waived its sovereign immunity by removing the case from state court
284
to federal court. It would seem “anomalous or inconsistent,” the
Court observed, for a state to invoke federal jurisdiction by removing
285
286
and then to assert immunity from that jurisdiction. Citing Gunter
287
and Clark, the Court applied the rule that once a state voluntarily
becomes a party to a case and submits its rights for judicial determi288
nation, it is bound by that action. By consenting to removal, Geor-

276. Id. at 621.
277. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247–
48 (1900).
278. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620–21.
279. Id. at 616.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 617.
282. Id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)).
283. Id. at 619.
284. Id. at 624.
285. Id. at 619.
286. Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273 (1906).
287. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
288. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619–20.
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gia had consented to having the federal district court rule on the state
law claims against it.
Moreover, the Court held, the alleged incapacity of the state’s
counsel, as a matter of state law, to waive the state’s immunity was ir289
relevant. The Court first distinguished its previous cases on this
topic (such as Ford Motor Co.) on the ground that they did not involve state parties that had voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a
federal court.290 Even more importantly, however, the Court also observed that the rule governing voluntary invocations of federal jurisdiction was based on “the problems of inconsistency and unfairness”
that would inhere in permitting a state to first invoke, and then claim
immunity from, federal jurisdiction.291 To avoid such inconsistency
and unfairness, the Court held, the question of whether state laws,
rules, or activities amount to a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity must be a question of federal law, not state law.292 The Court
therefore overruled Ford Motor Co. “insofar as it would otherwise
293
apply.”
Lapides provides a strong (and unanimous) shift back in the direction of the traditional rule regarding waivers of state sovereign
immunity. The Court did not apply a “stringent” test that demanded a
“clear declaration” of a state’s “altogether voluntary” waiver of its
294
immunity from suit. The Court distinguished waivers subject to that
stringent test from “waivers effected by litigation conduct.”295 The
Court thus reinvoked the distinction between cases involving state
consent to suit and cases involving waivers of a state’s immunity from
suit without consent. As to the latter, Lapides returned to the traditional rule that a waiver may be inferred from a state’s litigation conduct.
The impact of Lapides has, however, been disputed. Lower
courts are already in disagreement about how to read it. Some have
treated it as a narrow decision applicable only to cases following its

289. Id. at 621–23.
290. Id. at 622.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 622–23.
293. Id. at 623.
294. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
675–76 (1999) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858)); Great N. Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241
(1985) (describing the limited conditions under which a state waives its sovereign immunity).
295. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620.
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precise pattern (i.e., cases removed from state court to federal court
296
by a sovereign state defendant), while others have applied a broad
297
rule of waiver in light of the “spirit” of Lapides.
Further thinking about this area of law is, therefore, still very
necessary. Having examined the ideologization of waiver doctrine descriptively, it is now time to form a normative judgment about it. As
the next Part shows, the ideologization of waiver doctrine is regrettable. The rules of Ford Motor Co. and Edelman fail basic tests of
common sense. They simply do not provide reasonable rules for running a judicial system. Even starting from the official theory of the
Eleventh Amendment, rather than the diversity theory, there is no
sufficient explanation for the post-1945 rules of waiver. They make
sense only in the context of an ideologized doctrine of state sovereign
immunity.
To recapture a reasonable doctrine of waiver, the Supreme Court
must follow Schacht and Lapides. It must make clear that these cases
are not limited in the ways in which some lower courts are attempting
to read them. It must confirm that, as other lower courts have held,
these cases have vitiated the rule of Edelman and have reinstated the
traditional rules governing waivers of state sovereign immunity.
III. WAIVER DOCTRINE, NON-IDEOLOGIZED
A sensible, non-ideologized waiver doctrine would balance the
importance of state sovereign immunity against the legitimate needs
of the federal judicial system. State sovereign immunity is, without
question, an important value under the official theory of the Eleventh
Amendment. As this Part shows, however, even the official theory

296. See, e.g., Bravo Perazza v. Puerto Rico, 218 F. Supp. 2d 176, 179 (D.P.R. 2002) (stating
that Lapides is “particular” to the situation of removal and finding no waiver where a state defendant failed to assert immunity prior to filing a motion for summary judgment); Montgomery
v. Maryland, No. 00-1019, slip op. at 1 (D. Md. July 8, 2002) (stating that Lapides is “confined to
the proposition that a state that has removed a case to the federal court is estopped from asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
297. See In re Bliemeister, 296 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding waiver of immunity
where the state makes a “tactical” decision to argue the merits of the case, as otherwise states
would have the unfair advantage of hearing the court’s substantive comments on the merits of a
case before asserting an immunity defense); see also Ku v. Tennessee, 322 F.3d 431, 435 (6th Cir.
2003) (stating that “the rule [of Lapides] is consistent only with the view that the immunity defense in cases otherwise falling within a federal court’s original jurisdiction should be treated
like the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction”); Howard v. Food Lion, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d
585, 593–94 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (concluding that an official defendant waived state sovereign immunity, even as to claims under federal law, by removing the case to federal court).
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does not require courts to regard state sovereign immunity as the only
value to be taken into account, with all other considerations excluded.
If courts placed even minimal weight on the other values affected by
rules of waiver, the doctrine would produce results consistent with the
traditional rules of waiver applied by the Supreme Court prior to
1945.
A. The Ability to Waive at All
The first question is why states can waive their immunity at all.
One of the many paradoxes of state sovereign immunity doctrine is
that the Eleventh Amendment, as the Supreme Court likes to point
out when it is in a restrictive mood, is phrased as a limitation on the
298
federal judicial power. Usually, such limitations are not avoidable at
299
all, not even by Act of Congress, and certainly not by the mere consent of the parties to a federal case.300 And yet, a state may “waive at
pleasure” its immunity defense. How something can be both jurisdic301
tional and waivable is a paradox.

298. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) (“The text of the Amendment itself is clear enough on this point: ‘The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI)).
Of course, the Court’s convenient ellipsis omits the words “commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state,” U.S. CONST. amend. XI, which show that the amendment does not, textually, apply to
suits such as Seminole Tribe. The Court’s argument incongruously suggests that courts are
strictly bound by some of the text of the Eleventh Amendment, but are free to ignore the rest.
See Siegel, supra note 53, at 60 & n.124 (discussing this point).
299. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–80 (1803) (finding that Congress may not add to the Supreme Court’s constitutionally specified original jurisdiction); cf.
Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136–39 (1989) (construing a federal officer removal statute
narrowly so as to avoid the “grave constitutional problems” that would be presented if the statute were construed so as to grant removal jurisdiction over cases that did not present any federal question).
300. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)
(“[T]he parties by consent cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond
the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2.”); cf. Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126,
126–27 (1804) (holding that the jurisdiction of a federal court may be challenged even by the
plaintiff who chose to sue there).
301. Similarly, state sovereign immunity occupies an unusual position as a defense that need
not be raised by a court sua sponte, Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998);
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982), and yet (at least according to some
courts of appeals) can be raised by a court sua sponte at the court’s discretion. E.g., Howard v.
Virginia, 8 Fed. Appx. 318, 319–20 (6th Cir. 2001); Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d
452, 465–66 (5th Cir. 1999). Indeed, despite its waivability, some courts have raised Eleventh
Amendment immunity sua sponte even over the defense counsel’s express objection. See Linkenhoker v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 51, 53–54 (4th Cir. 1975) (rejecting the attorney general of
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Diversity theorists might resolve the paradox by determining that
the Eleventh Amendment sets up a limitation on federal judicial
power that is, in fact, not waivable. The amendment repeals federal
judicial power, a diversity theorist would say, over cases that are
brought against a state by a citizen of another state or a citizen or
subject of a foreign state and that are not otherwise within the federal
judicial power. Thus, a modern-day Chisolm could not sue a state in
federal court on a simple breach of contract claim, whether the state
consented or not.
Such a rule would make sense of the language of the amendment
and would be consistent with the traditional understanding that limitations on the federal judicial power cannot be avoided or waived. After all, if a modern-day Chisolm sued his own state in federal court for
breach of contract, no one would imagine that the suit could proceed
if only the state consented to it. No one would say that the problem
really lay in the defendant’s lack of consent to suit; the problem
would be that the suit simply failed to fall within any of the categories
of federal judicial power under Article III. It would not arise under
federal law, nor would it be within any of the categories of diversity
cases. State consent to suit would be irrelevant; the court would have
a clear duty to dismiss the case, acting sua sponte if necessary. The
Eleventh Amendment suggests that a similar result should apply to
cases based on state law brought against states in federal court by citizens of other states. The amendment removes such cases from the
federal judicial power, and they cannot be heard in federal court regardless of any state’s consent or any federal statute purporting to
302
confer jurisdiction.
To the extent that state sovereign immunity continued to exist
following adoption of the Eleventh Amendment (if at all), the immunity would not, under the diversity theory, be derived from a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power, but rather derived
from common law limits on recovery against states—limits that provided a substantive defense to suit. Even assuming that this defense
applied to actions based on federal law, such a common law, substanMaryland’s attempt to waive Maryland’s Eleventh Amendment immunity on the basis that he
had not been authorized to do so under state law).
302. Justice Stevens has expressed his support for this view. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23–26 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that there are “two Eleventh
Amendments,” the first a literal interpretation of the text which grants an immunity that Congress cannot abrogate, the second a judicially created doctrine of state immunity that the Court
has added to the text, which Congress has plenary power to abrogate).

SIEGEL.DOC

2003]

10/10/03 9:38 AM

STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

1221

tive defense, in contrast to a limitation on judicial power, could be
303
waived (or, a diversity theorist would add, abrogated by legislation).
Thus, the diversity theory could provide an appropriate resolution of the tension between the Eleventh Amendment’s phrasing as a
limit on federal judicial power and the waivability of state sovereign
immunity. Indeed, as Justice Stevens has observed, a key significance
of the waivability of state sovereign immunity is that it proves that
such immunity “is not a product of the limitation of judicial power
304
contained in the Eleventh Amendment.”
Adherents of the official theory have to provide a different explanation for the waivability of state sovereign immunity. To the extent that the official theory regards state sovereign immunity as de305
riving from the Eleventh Amendment itself, it is difficult to
reconcile the text of the amendment with the view that the immunity
it creates can be waived. Moreover, although the Supreme Court has
never squarely held that a state may waive its immunity from suits literally falling within the terms of the Eleventh Amendment,306 the lan-

303. For a slightly longer explication of this view, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
123–42, 159–69 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter’s view on this point seems to differ
slightly from Justice Brennan’s. Justice Brennan’s opinions do not appear to recognize a “state
sovereign immunity,” operating outside of the Eleventh Amendment, that might bar suit against
a state in a case to which the Eleventh Amendment did not apply. See, e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep’t
of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 497–503 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to admiralty suits and suggesting that states
therefore have no immunity from any admiralty action, even an action under the common law
of admiralty). Justice Souter is more open to the view that, even if Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to a case, a state’s sovereign immunity might nonetheless bar the suit, but
he views such sovereign immunity as a common law doctrine subject to congressional alteration.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 123–42, 159–69 (Souter, J., dissenting).
304. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 127–28 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“If it is indeed true that ‘private suits against States [are]
not permitted under Article III’ . . . then it is hard to see how a State’s sovereign immunity may
be waived any more than it may be abrogated by Congress.”).
305. See, e.g., Welch, 483 U.S. at 472 (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from
bringing suit against the citizen’s own State in federal court, even though the express terms of
the Amendment refer only to suits by citizens of another State.” (emphasis added)); id. at 473
(“[T]he Amendment bars suits in admiralty against the States, even though such suits are not,
strictly speaking, ‘suits in law or equity.’” (emphasis added)). As noted earlier, the official theory also, in other cases, relies on the view that state sovereign immunity derives from the Constitution but not from the Eleventh Amendment. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
306. Clark v. Barnard, although nothing more than a dispute arising under state law, might
not be regarded as a suit against a state under the Supreme Court’s approach to the case; the
Court said that the state’s appearance and claim to the fund within the possession of the court
made the case one in the nature of an interpleader. 108 U.S. 436, 448 (1882).
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guage in its waiver cases would appear to cover that possibility.
Thus, the official theory must explain how this limit on federal judicial power can be waived.
The answer, not clearly articulated in the cases, rests on the view,
long held by the official theory, that questions regarding state sovereign immunity are not to be answered by reference to the text of the
Eleventh Amendment. Rather, they are governed by nontextual principles of state sovereign immunity. The Court has long made this
point clear in cases restricting suits against states. In Alden, for example, the Court declared that “the sovereign immunity of the States
neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh
308
Amendment.” This statement, moreover, was merely the capstone
of a venerable tradition of disregarding the amendment’s text and appealing to underlying principles instead. As early as Hans v. Louisiana,309 the Court was treating the text with something approaching derision. When the plaintiff in that case tried to invoke the “letter” of
the Constitution to show that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar
his suit, the Court criticized his argument as “an attempt to strain the
Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or
dreamed of.”310 It called the notion that the amendment’s framers
could have regarded its literal text as determining the boundaries of
state sovereign immunity “almost an absurdity on its face.”311 Subsequent cases continued to affirm that the amendment is “but an exemplification” of the underlying “fundamental rule” that really governs
cases involving state sovereign immunity,312 and that what matters in
sovereign immunity cases is not the text of the amendment, but the
“postulates which limit and control” even the text of the Constitution.313
All that is needed is to apply this principle to cases permitting
suits against states just as much as it applies to cases barring suits
against states. The Eleventh Amendment’s text that limits the federal
judicial power simply does not matter under the official theory, just as
307. E.g., id. at 447 (“The immunity from suit belonging to a State, which is respected and
protected by the Constitution within the limits of the judicial power of the United States, is a
personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure . . . .”).
308. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
309. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
310. Id. at 15.
311. Id.
312. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
313. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
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the text limiting the scope of the amendment to suits against states by
citizens of other states does not matter, as the Court has made clear
over and over again. What matters is not the text itself, but rather the
principles of state sovereign immunity. Those principles show that the
immunity applies only in cases where the state has not consented to
suit or otherwise waived its immunity, regardless of what the amendment’s text says.
Thus, under both the official theory and the diversity theory, the
possibility of waiver of state sovereign immunity ultimately stems
from a recognition that the immunity bar does not derive from a textual, constitutional limit on federal judicial power, but from background principles of sovereign immunity (common law principles, diversity theorists would say; constitutional principles, according to the
official theory). This point has important implications for the content
of the rules of consent and waiver. Once it is properly understood
that courts are applying principles rather than a clear, textual rule,
they necessarily have more freedom to consult logic and tradition to
determine the content of the applicable principles. Logic and tradition show that the problem with suits against a sovereign dissolve
314
when the sovereign consents to suit. The implications of this point
are explored in the next Section.
314. To the extent that sovereign immunity derives “from the laws and practices of our
English ancestors,” United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882), it would naturally be subject
to the English rule, which permitted suit against the sovereign with the sovereign’s consent. Id.
Professor Caleb Nelson explains waivability differently in his notable article, Sovereign
Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002). For Professor
Nelson, the Eleventh Amendment states a limitation on the federal judicial power, and, to the
extent that that limitation applies, it can neither be abrogated nor waived. Id. at 1615, 1623. This
limitation on federal subject matter jurisdiction, however, applies only to suits described by the
Eleventh Amendment itself. Id. at 1556. Professor Nelson does not determine whether the
amendment applies to federal question suits or whether the “diversity” reading of the amendment is correct, see id. at 1623–24 (discussing the implications of accepting or rejecting the “diversity” reading of the Eleventh Amendment), but, in either event, he regards the sovereign
immunity that states enjoy with regard to suits not described by the text of the Eleventh
Amendment (for example, suits against a state by one of its own citizens) as arising from doctrines related to personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction, see id. at 1567–1608 (using
historical and textual evidence to support this claim). The protection that states enjoy in suits
not described by the Eleventh Amendment is therefore waivable. Id. at 1617.
Insofar as waivability is concerned, Professor Nelson’s provocative thesis is somewhat
similar to the view expressed in this Article, in that both regard waivability as resulting from
principles of state sovereign immunity, not from anything in the text of the Eleventh Amendment. The difference is that this Article observes that the same point is true, even under the official theory, even if the immunity is regarded as going to a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The official theory has always determined the extent of that immunity by looking to
background principles governing immunity, not to the text of the Eleventh Amendment; this
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B. The Rules of Consent and Waiver
Once it is understood that states may take action that eliminates
their own immunity from suit in federal court, the next question is
what actions have that effect. The traditions of state sovereign immunity and the fundamental principles underlying that immunity show
that the pre-1945 cases were correct to apply quite different rules to
cases involving consent than to cases involving waiver.
Certainly one basis for finding elimination of a state’s sovereign
immunity is that a state has made its own decision to eliminate the
immunity; this is the basis of the consent cases. When a federal court
is asked to entertain a suit against a state on this ground, it is appropriate for the court to look to state law to determine whether such
consent exists. The essence of this basis for suit is that the state has
made its own decision to consent; what a state’s “own decision” is
must be determined by reference to the state’s own law, under which
the state may have consented or not and may have attached conditions or limitations to the consent.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has appropriately applied a stringent test to determine whether a state has consented to suit. The reason for this is not so much any constitutional command as it is a
common-sense estimation of a state’s likely attitude toward suits in
federal court. There are many important reasons why a state might
wish to permit itself to be sued: a state can enhance its credit by permitting itself to be sued on its contracts, and a state’s desire to do justice, particularly toward its own citizens, may cause a state to waive its
immunity in tort actions and actions based on statutes. The greater
part of these objectives can, however, be achieved without the necessity of a state’s subjecting itself to suit in a forum beyond its control.
Subjecting itself to suit in federal court might, to be sure, do even
more to enhance a state’s credit and promote justice in cases in which
the state is a defendant, but the choice of forum is surely a marginal
point compared with the willingness of the state to be sued at all. Accordingly, the rule providing that state statutes waiving immunity
from suit should normally be interpreted to apply only to a state’s
own courts provides a good judicial estimation of likely legislative intent.

Article simply observes that reliance on principles rather than text is as appropriate when permitting suits as when barring them.
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Thus, the Court’s traditional rules regarding state consent to suit,
which give states plenary control over such consent, make sense. But
it cannot be maintained that states have a like degree of control over
waivers of immunity from suit. Even the official theory, if one just
stops to examine it, has never granted states plenary control over
waivers of immunity. For example, everyone accepts that when a state
files a proof of claim in bankruptcy, it necessarily waives immunity
from the federal courts’ determination of the validity of the claim; the
federal court may consider the debtor’s objections to the claim, determine the claim’s proper amount and its priority, and, if appropriate, discharge the debtor from the claim.315 It even appears to be generally agreed that the state’s filing of a proof of claim waives the
state’s immunity from federal consideration of the debtor’s compulsory counterclaims.316
Even this simple example demonstrates that states do not have
plenary control over waivers of their immunity comparable to their
plenary control over consent to suit. Similarly, even before Lapides,
the official theory permitted a state’s litigation counsel to take actions
that waived the state’s sovereign immunity regardless of the counsel’s
317
lack of competence to do so under state law. These examples show
that although state consent to suit is “altogether voluntary” and may
be attended with such conditions as the state thinks proper, waiver is
different. Certain actions taken by a state have the effect of waiving
state sovereign immunity in certain ways whether the state likes it or
not and notwithstanding any attempts by the state to set conditions.
In other words, consent to suit is purely a matter of state law, but
waiver of immunity from suit without consent is judged by federal
law. Federal law sometimes finds a waiver of immunity that state law
does not countenance.

315. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 (1947).
316. Arecibo Cmty. Health Care, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 270 F.3d 17, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2001); In
re Lazar, 237 F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Straight, 143 F.3d 1387, 1390 (10th Cir. 1998); In
re Creative Goldsmiths of Wash., D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1997); In re 995 Fifth
Ave. Assocs., L.P., 963 F.2d 503, 507–08 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Friendship Med. Care Ctr., Ltd.,
710 F.2d 1297, 1300–01 (7th Cir. 1983). There is disagreement as to whether the value of the
compulsory counterclaim can exceed the value of the claim. Compare Arecibo Cmty. Health
Care, 270 F.3d at 27 (holding that it can), with Friendship Med. Care Ctr., 710 F.2d at 1300–01
(taking the contrary view). The Seventh Circuit’s holding on this point in Friendship Medical
Center is arguably dictum, inasmuch as the court also indicated that the counterclaim involved
in that case was unrelated to the state’s claim. 710 F.3d at 1300–01.
317. See infra Part III.C.4.
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The underlying principles of sovereign immunity justify this distinction. (Recall that, as Part III.A discusses, state sovereign immunity does not derive from an inflexible, textual rule, but rather from
principles that are subject to some judicial elaboration.) Even starting
with the assumptions of the official theory, under which state sovereign immunity has great value, it does not have infinite value. The
Constitution requires the federal government to respect the sovereign
immunity of the states, but the official theory recognizes that the
states took on some obligations to each other and to the United
States by joining the Union. These obligations explain, for example, a
state’s lack of immunity from suit by another state or by the United
318
States. They also justify the rule, recognized even under the official
theory, that federal law may sometimes determine that a state has
waived its sovereign immunity notwithstanding the state’s own, contrary law. This rule is justified so long as the legitimate needs of the
federal judicial system are capable of receiving some, even if minimal,
weight against which the state’s sovereign immunity must be balanced. A non-ideologized doctrine of state sovereign immunity would
recognize that just as the federal government must respect the states’
sovereign immunity, so too must the states exercise their sovereign
immunity in a minimally responsible way that does not make it impossible for the federal judicial system to function.
Therefore, as Lapides properly recognized,319 whether a state has
waived its immunity from suit is not a question of state law, but a
question of federal law. This is the critical point. It still remains to determine what the federal rule should be. This question is best answered by considering the various situations in which waivers of state
immunity may arise.
C. Varieties of Waivers
In considering which actions should constitute a waiver of state
sovereign immunity, one must recognize the various situations in
which such waivers may arise. These situations mostly concern actions
taken in litigation, although Parden-type cases are somewhat different.

318. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
319. See Lapides, 535 U.S. at 621–22.
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1. Waivers by Failure to Assert Immunity. The most commonly
recurring set of cases are those in which a state defendant initially
fails to assert its immunity when sued in federal court, and then tries
320
to assert immunity belatedly. Application of the principles explored
in the previous Section shows that the traditional rule from the pre1945 cases, which treated the defense of state sovereign immunity
rather like the defense of personal jurisdiction insofar as waiver is
concerned, strikes the appropriate balance between state interests
and the legitimate needs of the federal judicial system. On the one
hand, the rule prevents states from engaging in unfair tactics that
waste federal judicial resources. On the other hand, the rule is respectful of state prerogatives.
The notion that states may assert sovereign immunity “at any
321
time,” which crept into the cases starting in 1945, is simply an invitation for states to play games with justice. Under this rule, a state,
when sued, may choose to litigate on the merits, knowing that if it
wins, it will have a judgment that it can enforce through res judicata,
while if it loses, it can still assert its immunity on appeal.322 Such tactics
are unfair and unworthy of sovereign dignity. As some courts have
observed, litigating on the merits while holding an immunity defense
in reserve “undermine[s] the integrity of the judicial system,”323 and is
“grossly inequitable.”324 The state can allow the lawsuit to proceed until it senses that things are not going well, and then assert immunity
325
and have the proceedings dismissed.
In addition to its unfairness, such conduct also entails an obvious
waste of federal judicial resources. There is no point to having a federal court expend time and energy considering the merits of a case,
only to dismiss the case on immunity grounds later. The rule permitting belated assertion of state sovereign immunity requires just such
waste.
Delaying assertion of sovereign immunity also unfairly drains the
plaintiff’s resources. In the days of the traditional rule, the Supreme
320. See supra Part II.A.
321. McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Lyndonville Sav. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000)).
322. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing doubts about the “propriety” of the rule).
323. Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 201
F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000).
324. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999).
325. Hill, 179 F.3d at 756–57.

SIEGEL.DOC

1228

10/10/03 9:38 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:1167

Court, although very respectful of state interests, gave at least some
326
consideration to the interests of “the other party.” To permit a sovereign party to “come in and go out of court at its will, the other party
having no right of resistance to either step,” would, the Court held,
carry the rule of sovereign immunity too far.327 If a state is going to defeat a plaintiff’s claim by asserting sovereign immunity, prompt assertion of the defense at least has the virtue of ending the case before the
plaintiff has devoted unnecessary resources to litigation of the merits.
In short, permitting assertion of state sovereign immunity at any
time is simply not a sensible way to run a judicial system. It allows unfair tactics that would never be tolerated if used by other parties, and
it wastes the resources of the plaintiff and the judicial system itself.
By contrast, the traditional rule, requiring timely assertion of
state sovereign immunity, is in no way incompatible with state dignity
or state prerogatives. The traditional rule preserves the sovereign
prerogative of declining to answer the suit of private parties. It requires only that states assert this prerogative in an orderly fashion
that shows a minimal level of regard for the legitimate interests of the
328
federal judicial system in avoiding unfairness and waste. The rule of
state sovereign immunity gives states as much as any defendant could
ask for—all a state defendant in a federal case needs to do is say “we
don’t care to be sued,” and the case is dismissed. It hardly seems burdensome to require that state defendants actually say this, and say it
promptly.
Thus, the traditional rule struck a fair and appropriate balance
among the interests of private plaintiffs, state defendants, and the
federal judicial system. On the one hand, it required very little of
states and preserved their prerogative of not being sued. On the other
hand, it provided substantial benefits in terms of fairness and efficiency for the judicial system. In terms of plain common sense, the
traditional rule had a great deal going for it.
The rejection of the traditional rule can only be the product of a
fully ideologized doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Again, the
hallmark of this ideologization is that, in balancing the interests involved, the Court has refused to give any weight whatever to interests

326. Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U.S. 627, 632 (1914).
327. Id.
328. See Hill, 179 F.3d at 763 (reasoning that requiring timely assertion of state sovereign
immunity “does not diminish the rights afforded to the states under the Eleventh Amendment”).
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other than the interests of the state. Even though the traditional rule
made only the most minimal intrusion on state interests (requiring no
more than that states assert their interests in a prompt and orderly
fashion), and even though the traditional rule provided substantial
benefits to other parties and to the federal judicial system (by avoiding waste of resources), the Court rejected it and applied a rule that
promotes gamesmanship and waste. A non-ideologized doctrine
would give at least some weight to the other interests involved and
would not abandon basic, common-sense notions of how to run a judicial system. Even accepting the importance of the state interest in
sovereign immunity, a non-ideologized doctrine would recognize that
the federal system need not further that interest at all costs, and that,
just as the federal system respects state rights, it is appropriate to require states to show the minimal degree of respect for the federal system that is entailed by requiring them to assert their sovereign immunity promptly if they desire to assert it at all.
Although the recent decision in Lapides concerned the situation
of a case removed by a state defendant from state court to federal
court, it supports the analysis given above and suggests that the Court
has, indeed, returned to its traditional rules regarding waiver. The
case contains the critical recognition that federal courts must give at
least some weight to interests other than those of the state. Lapides
expressed appropriate concern for “the problems of inconsistency and
unfairness” that result from giving a state carte blanche with regard to
329
assertion of its immunity from suit —a statement reminiscent of the
Court’s prior concern for the interests of “the other party” in litiga330
tion against a state. Once the concern of fairness is brought into the
picture, it becomes clear that states cannot simply assert immunity at
any time in litigation; allowing assertion of immunity at any time
would inevitably lead to hardship, waste, and unfairness. Those lower
courts that have given a narrow reading to Lapides are therefore mistaken. Although the particular circumstances of the case may be limited, the reasoning of the case endorses the crucial values underpinning the traditional rule that sovereign immunity is waived if not
timely asserted.331

329. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 535 U.S. 613, 622 (2002).
330. Ramos, 232 U.S. at 632.
331. Professor Bohannan suggests that states “likely will not be held to have waived their sovereign
immunity by merely failing to raise the immunity as a defense in the trial court.” Bohannan, supra note 5,
at 291. Her argument, however, relies on Ford Motor Co., see id. at 290, which has been overruled since
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The only remaining detail is to determine the precise rule governing the timeliness of assertions of state sovereign immunity.
Should a state be required to assert sovereign immunity in the first response to a plaintiff’s complaint (as is true with regard to the defense
of personal jurisdiction)? Or should the defense be subject to some
other rule?
Although many different rules could be imagined, once one
agrees on the basic principle that timely assertion should be required,
it seems fairly straightforward to conclude that the rule governing
timeliness should be the same as the rule governing the timeliness of
assertions of lack of personal jurisdiction: such assertions must be
made in a defendant’s first response to a plaintiff’s complaint,
whether that response be an answer or a motion to dismiss. Failure to
assert the defense in the initial response to the complaint would con332
stitute waiver.
This rule would have several advantages. First, it is a familiar
rule. Even first-year law students know that a defendant needs to
think carefully before making the first response to a complaint, because failure to raise certain defenses in that response will have the
effect of waiving those defenses. Applying this rule would avoid the
need to come up with the details of a rule that would uniquely apply
to the state sovereign immunity defense.
The familiar rule is also easy to administer. Other possibilities
could require unnecessarily delicate judgments. A rule, for example,
that required a court to consider whether the state’s failure to assert
immunity in a timely fashion had prejudiced the plaintiff would be
much harder to apply. The familiar rule provides a clear cutoff for the
assertion of sovereign immunity.
Finally, this rule would best serve the goals of the traditional
waiver rule: it would best avoid unfairness and waste of federal judicial resources. The Supreme Court has indicated that, if a state asserts

the publication of her article; also, she does not consider the pre-1945 cases that established waiver by
failure to assert immunity as the traditional rule, nor the way that Schacht reinstated that rule.
332. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g), (h) (“If a party makes a motion under this rule but omits
therefrom any defense or objection then available . . . the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted . . . .”). Notice that this rule would mean that
if a state passed a statute consenting to suit in federal court, it could not withdraw that consent
once its counsel, in accordance with the statute, failed to assert immunity in response to a federal-court complaint. This result is not inconsistent with Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
527 (1858), discussed in supra Part II.A.1. That case concerned proceedings in state court, where
principles of waiver do not implicate the needs of the federal judicial system.
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its immunity from suit, the court must usually consider the immunity
333
issue before any other. Consideration of other issues, particularly
merits issues, before consideration of sovereign immunity will nor334
mally be wasteful. Accordingly, a rule providing that sovereign immunity, like personal jurisdiction, is waived if not asserted in a state’s
first response to a plaintiff’s complaint would best preserve federal
judicial resources.335
2. Waiver by Invoking the Federal Court’s Jurisdiction. The official theory already correctly handles cases in which a state invokes
the jurisdiction of a federal court (such as by filing a proof of claim in
a bankruptcy proceeding). A state may be immune from suit without
333. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778–80
(2000). The Court did allow the prior consideration of questions of whether the state is a suitable defendant as a matter of statutory interpretation. Id. at 780.
334. One might argue that no time is wasted if a case is dismissed on some non-immunity
ground. Still, consideration of such grounds would entail at least potential waste, because if a
case survives a challenge based on an issue other than immunity, but then is dismissed later on
immunity grounds, the consideration of the initial challenge will have been wasted.
335. Indeed, a straightforward reading of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
would suggest that, at least to some extent, this rule already applies to assertions of state sovereign immunity. Rule 12(g) provides that:
If a party makes a motion under this rule but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to the party which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the
party shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in subdivision (h)(2) hereof on any of the grounds
there stated.
The defense of state sovereign immunity is a defense that may “be raised by motion” under
Rule 12. It is not one of the defenses provided for in Rule 12(h)(2). Consequently, Rule 12(g)
would appear to provide that if a state defendant moves to dismiss a case for some reason besides sovereign immunity (such as failure to state a claim) without asserting the sovereign immunity defense, the defendant may not assert the sovereign immunity defense thereafter; i.e.,
the defense is waived. Rule 12(h)(3), to be sure, provides that “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the action,” but the Supreme Court has now made clear that an unasserted state
sovereign immunity defense is not a jurisdictional obstacle to a federal court’s consideration of a
case. Accordingly, the plain text of Rule 12 suggests that a state waives its sovereign immunity
from a case against it in federal court by moving to dismiss the case on other, non-immunity
grounds.
Of course, the Supreme Court might not feel bound by the text of Rule 12, just as, in considering questions of state sovereign immunity, it does not feel bound by the text of the Constitution itself. See supra Part I.A. The point is not so much that the text of Rule 12 should necessarily be dispositive as it is that Rule 12 suggests that the waiver rule proposed here is a
reasonable one that appropriately balances the interests of state defendants against those of private plaintiffs. Such reasonable balancing of interests is appropriate now that the Supreme
Court has made clear that state sovereign immunity is not an inflexible, jurisdictional barrier,
and is subject to the general principle of avoiding “inconsistency, anomaly, and unfairness,”
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 535 U.S. 613, 620 (2002).
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consent, but once the state asks a court to take action, the court can336
not be prevented from taking action that is legally correct. There is
an implicit parallel here between immunity and the famous jurisdiction-stripping debate. Congress may or may not have the power to
strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear specified cases, but it cannot
tell a court to hear a case and then command it to decide the case
other than according to the law.337 Similarly, once a state asks a federal court to take some action in its favor, the court is bound to decide the case correctly. Moreover, fair consideration of the state’s
claims may require the court to consider the defendant’s counterclaims. Thus, the official theory is correct to recognize a state’s invocation of a federal court’s jurisdiction as constituting a waiver of the
state’s sovereign immunity, notwithstanding anything to the contrary
in state law.
The Court’s latest decisions in Schacht and Lapides support this
338
rule. Indeed, as noted earlier, these cases seem rather surprising.
Even though the overall trend in state sovereign immunity is quite
clearly one of ever increasing stringency, the Court has unanimously
eased the rules regarding waiver, retracted its previous intimations
that state sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, and even overruled
Ford Motor Co., which was perhaps the most troubling case in the
area. Thus, the trend in the waiver cases cuts against the general direction of the trend in Eleventh Amendment doctrine, instead of reinforcing it, as was true in earlier eras.339 The latest cases might, therefore, seem to refute the contention that ideology has driven the
developments in this doctrinal area. While it is certainly true that, after 1945, the previous, carefully drawn distinctions between consent
cases and waiver cases got swept away amidst the overall trend of developments in state sovereign immunity doctrine, the latest cases may
show that ideology does not control everything: the Supreme Court
may apply sensible rules governing consent and waiver even while

336. See, e.g., In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1148 (4th
Cir. 1997) (“[I]t would violate the fundamental fairness of judicial process to allow a state to
proceed in federal court and at the same time strip the defendant of valid defenses because they
might be construed to be affirmative claims against the state.”).
337. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (1953) (“If Congress directs an
Article III court to decide a case, I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the power of
Congress to tell the court how to decide it.”).
338. See supra Part II.E.
339. See supra Part II.D.
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moving the immunity doctrine as a whole very strongly in the direction of states’ rights.
On the other hand, even these latest cases may be consistent with
the ideological explanation for the developments in waiver doctrine.
The pull of ideology may be strongest at times when the direction of
the overall state sovereign immunity doctrine remains contested. In
the late twentieth century, prior to Seminole Tribe, the Supreme
Court gradually strengthened state sovereign immunity, but the overall doctrinal stream contained many eddies and countercurrents. The
1960s saw the rise of constructive consent as a mechanism for avoiding state sovereign immunity; the 1970s and 80s brought the Edelman
decision barring retroactive monetary relief in suits against state officers and the increasingly strict rule of interpretation applied to federal statutes that purportedly abrogated state sovereign immunity;
then the 1989 decision in Union Gas appeared to provide a broad
avenue for suits against states for retroactive monetary relief. As long
as the Court was still locked in a struggle to decide the most fundamental questions of state sovereign immunity law, reasonable compromise may have been impossible on any issues, even issues of consent and waiver. Now that Seminole Tribe and subsequent cases have
so firmly cemented state sovereign immunity in general, perhaps the
Justices who favor it feel they can afford to give way on the issue of
waiver.
3. Waiver by Removal. Lapides also successfully resolved the
recurring question posed by cases in which a state, upon being sued in
its own courts, removes the suit to federal court. Removal provides
yet another good illustration of why the consent standard of clear,
340
“altogether voluntary” consent cannot apply to waiver cases. A
state that files a removal petition does not thereby clearly and altogether voluntarily declare that it consents to be sued in federal court.
The consent is implied, not explicit. But, as the Supreme Court recognized in Lapides, there can be little doubt that permitting a state to
remove a case to federal court, only to challenge the court’s ability to
hear the case, is just the sort of wasteful gamesmanship that a rational, non-ideologized judicial system would not tolerate.341
Lapides’ particular facts, however, did not give the Supreme
Court occasion to note a practically and theoretically important pe340.
341.

Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858).
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 535 U.S. 613, 621 (2002).
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culiarity of waiver by removal. Waiver by removal is a particular case
of waiver by invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction, but it is special
in that the waiver it effects should be limited in scope. Lapides, as it
happened, concerned only claims as to which the state had waived its
immunity from suit in state court. The Supreme Court, therefore, had
no occasion to determine what should happen if a plaintiff sues a
state, in state court, on claims as to which the state would be immune
342
in that court, and the state then removes the case to federal court.
Such cases would require a court to recognize that state sovereign immunity has two independent aspects: it is partly an immunity
from suit in a particular forum (federal court) and partly a substantive
343
immunity from liability. The Supreme Court has long held that a
state may waive one of these aspects of its sovereign immunity without waiving the other: cases holding that a state may waive its immunity from liability without waiving its immunity from suit in a federal
forum are legion.344
Although Lapides did not require the Court to consider the
point, it should logically follow that a state may do exactly the opposite: it may waive its forum immunity without waiving its underlying
immunity from liability. Moreover, removal should be understood to
waive only forum immunity. A state, upon being sued in state court,
and wishing to assert its substantive immunity from liability, might
well desire to have the validity of that assertion tested in a federal
court. In an appropriate case (say, a case involving a delicate question
of whether a federal statute was a proper exercise of Congress’s
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment), the state
might believe that federal judges would better understand the federal
constitutional issues surrounding its assertion of immunity than would
its own state judges.
In general, any defendant in state court facing such a situation
may remove the case to federal court so as to take advantage of federal judges’ expertise. Even in less worthy cases—if, for example, a
defendant simply believes that federal judges are more biased in favor
of defendants than are the state judges in the state involved—the de-

342. Id. at 617 (noting that the Court need not address this situation).
343. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683, 1697 (1997) (explaining “forum-allocation” and “immunity-from-liability” interpretations
of the Eleventh Amendment).
344. E.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
676 (1999); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
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fendant may remove the case, if the case is within the federal jurisdiction, and then have its substantive defenses tested in the federal
345
court. Under a non-ideologized doctrine that seeks sensible procedural rules, as opposed to procedural rules that are but masks for extension of the underlying substantive doctrines, states should certainly be no less entitled to this privilege than anyone else.
Accordingly, removal of a case by a state defendant should be
understood to waive the defendant’s special privilege from being sued
in federal court, and to permit the federal court to hear any claim
against the defendant that might have been heard in the state court
from which the case was removed. It should not, however, waive the
defendant’s immunity from any claims from which it would have been
immune in state court.
4. The Issue of State Counsel’s Authority. Prior to Lapides, particular disarray surrounded the issue of whether a waiver of state sovereign immunity can occur in litigation only when the state’s counsel
is competent under state law to waive sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Co. provided an apparently
clear answer, but the Supreme Court subsequently permitted departure from its rule on the basis of inadequate distinctions. Lapides
overruled Ford Motor Co., but it is still necessary to consider the issue
in light of the principles discussed above, particularly in light of the
Court’s somewhat cryptic statement that it was overruling Ford Motor
Co. “insofar as it would otherwise apply.”346
In Ford Motor Co., as Part II.B discussed, the state did not raise
347
the issue of immunity until the case reached the Supreme Court.
The state’s attorneys conceded that they had waived the state’s immunity if they were competent to do so, but they claimed that, under
state law, they lacked the necessary authority to waive sovereign immunity.348 The Supreme Court agreed. It determined that a state’s
counsel’s actions could not waive the state’s sovereign immunity in
the absence of state law authorization, and that the attorneys had no
such authorization under Indiana law.349

345. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
346. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 623.
347. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 468–69.
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The Ford Motor Co. rule would appear as clear as one might desire: the state did not assert its immunity until the last possible moment, when the case had reached the Supreme Court itself; moreover,
the state conceded that its attorneys’ actions would constitute a
waiver of sovereign immunity but for the authority issue. The Supreme Court’s determination that the state could still assert its immunity under such circumstances suggested that the rule requiring state
law authority for waiver of immunity is a very strong one indeed.
Even before Lapides, however, Schacht had already permitted an
inexplicable departure from this rule. In Schacht, the Supreme Court
determined that federal courts are not obliged to consider a state’s
350
immunity defense sua sponte. The Court held that state sovereign
immunity does not automatically deprive a federal court of jurisdiction over a case; a state must assert its immunity before a federal
court is obliged to consider it. If the state fails to assert the issue of
immunity, the Supreme Court said, “a court can ignore it.”351
If one stops to think about it, this holding is clearly inconsistent
with the rule of Ford Motor Co., in which the Court held that a state’s
attorneys must be competent under state law to waive immunity or
else any waiver by them will be ineffective. Schacht effectively permits such waivers to occur regardless of the scope of a state attorney’s
authority to waive under state law. If state counsel simply fails to
raise the issue of state sovereign immunity, the federal court is entitled to ignore the issue. The Supreme Court did not say that a federal
court must ignore the issue of immunity if the state does not raise it,
but the court at least may do so, and, if it does, then the simple fact is
that the issue is effectively waived. The issue will not be considered
352
and the case will be decided. The rule of Ford Motor Co. should
logically demand that, before proceeding with a case against a state
on the ground that the state has not asserted its immunity, a federal
court must consider sua sponte the question of whether state law
permits the state’s attorneys to waive the state’s immunity.
Lower court decisions created similar paradoxes. In Montgomery
v. Maryland, the state, upon being sued under the federal Family and
Medical Leave Act, moved for dismissal on the ground of sovereign

350. Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998).
351. Id.
352. This analysis assumes that the failure to raise the issue and the judicial decision not to
consider the issue sua sponte persist throughout all stages of the litigation.
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353
immunity and for failure to state a claim under the act. Subsequently, however, the state acted erratically. First, it expressly withdrew its assertion of immunity and moved for dismissal solely for failure to state a claim.354 The district court, nonetheless, invoked
immunity sua sponte and dismissed the case.355 Then, on appeal, the
356
state changed course again and asserted its immunity.
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred as a matter
of law in raising the immunity issue sua sponte. Once a state expressly
and affirmatively withdraws the issue of its immunity, the court held,
a district court is obliged to respect the state’s decision and may not
impose “on a state a legal argument that the state first advanced but
357
then affirmatively withdrew.” The court also, however, permitted
the state to reassert its immunity on appeal. In doing so, the court relied on its understanding that Maryland state law did not permit the
state’s counsel to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the state.358
Whatever one thinks of the ultimate outcome, it would seem that
the Fourth Circuit’s rulings regarding the district court’s authority
359
and its own proper actions contradict one another. With regard to
its own decision, the court held that it must give effect to Maryland
state law, which did not, in the court’s view, permit the state’s counsel
to waive state sovereign immunity. On the other hand, the court held
that, once the state’s counsel had withdrawn the issue of immunity
from the case in district court, the district judge was barred from
raising the issue sua sponte. But if the state’s attorney’s disavowal of
immunity bars the court from considering it, then the state’s attorney
obviously can waive immunity by withdrawing it. If the court really
believed that state law controlled the issue of authority, it should have
held that the district court was not only permitted to raise the issue of
immunity sua sponte, but was in fact obliged to do so, at least to the

353. 266 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 1958 (2002).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 336–37.
356. Id. at 337.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 338.
359. This is a good place to remind the reader that I represent the plaintiff in this case. See
supra note †. So one might question my objectivity regarding the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. Still,
speaking respectfully, I must suggest that the court could not logically hold both that the district
court was obliged to respect the state’s waiver of immunity and also that state counsel’s lack of
authority rendered that waiver ineffective.
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extent necessary to consider whether the state’s counsel was properly
authorized under state law to waive immunity.
One may hope that Lapides’ express overruling of Ford Motor
Co. will put an end to this sort of confusion. Still, the narrow reading
that some lower courts have given to Lapides gives rise to the possibility that some courts may regard the case as having overruled Ford
Motor Co. only for cases in which a state, through its counsel, voluntarily invokes federal jurisdiction. As the above discussion shows,
however, such a limited reading would make no sense. Ford Motor
Co. held that a state’s attorneys can waive state sovereign immunity
only if duly authorized by state law to do so. The application of that
rule cannot turn on the manner in which immunity is waived. The issue in Ford Motor Co. was not the adequacy of the actions taken to
waive immunity, but the impossibility of waiver by an attorney not
authorized to waive.
To put it another way, in Lapides there were two issues: (1)
whether the state’s action (removing the case to federal court) constituted a waiver of immunity and (2) if so, whether that waiver was effective despite the state’s attorneys’ purported lack of state law
authority to waive immunity. Ford Motor Co. involved only the second issue. In Ford Motor Co., the state conceded that its actions constituted a waiver of immunity, if such a waiver could occur without
state law authority. Hence, the fact that the state’s actions in Lapides
may have constituted a particularly clear waiver of state sovereign
immunity must be irrelevant. The existence of conduct constituting a
waiver can never be any clearer than it was in Ford Motor Co., in
which the issue was conceded.
Thus, Lapides must have overruled Ford Motor Co. broadly, not
only for cases that a state removes from state court to federal court.
The statement that the Court was overruling Ford Motor Co. “insofar
as it would otherwise apply” simply meant that the Court was not
overruling every holding from Ford Motor Co.; the case’s holding that
refund suits against tax collectors are suits against the state is presumably still valid. But state law authority is simply not required before a state’s counsel can waive state sovereign immunity in the
course of litigation. The key is that, as noted earlier, although consent
to suit is a matter of the state’s voluntary agreement, which must be
determined by looking to state law, waiver of immunity is not a matter of voluntary agreement, but of whether the state has taken actions
that constitute a waiver, whether the state wants them to or not. The
standard of waiver is one of federal law, not state law.
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Accordingly, the only question of authority is the question properly analyzed in early cases such as Gunter: whether the state’s coun360
sel is authorized to represent the state in litigation. Obviously, a
state’s immunity would not be waived if any lawyer walked in off the
street and filed a document purporting to waive it. The court is
obliged to check that the attorney purporting to represent the state in
fact does so. But if the attorney possesses that degree of authority,
then the attorney’s actions may, under applicable federal rules, waive
the state’s immunity whether the state’s law so provides or not.
5. Waiver by Engaging in Federally Regulated Activity. Finally,
there is the issue of Parden: can Congress provide that a state’s choice
to engage in federally regulated activities will constitute waiver of
state sovereign immunity (or, as the Court used to say, constructive
361
consent to suit)? If Congress can do so, then a significant area for
provision of suits against states would be opened.
362
As noted earlier, this issue is somewhat different from the
other issues discussed in this Article. Its resolution does not call for a
balancing of state interests against the reasonable needs of the federal
judicial system, because the relevant state actions do not take place in
the context of federal litigation. Rather, the issue is more closely related to the question of the powers of Congress with regard to the
states.
363
As I briefly hinted in a prior article, the best way to think about
this issue is to begin by imagining that Congress, instead of providing,
implicitly or otherwise, that states engaging in certain activities will be
deemed to have consented to suit in connection with those activities,
instead requires that states expressly consent to such suits before engaging in the activities. It appears that the Supreme Court would then
approve such suits in at least some circumstances. In College Savings
Bank, the Supreme Court suggested that Congress may require a
state to waive its immunity from suit in exchange for a federal “gift or
364
gratuity.” Thus, Congress’s power appears secure in regard to many
important areas of federally regulated activity. College Savings Bank

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
(1999).

Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 285–86 (1906).
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep’t., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
See supra Part II.C.
Siegel, supra note 53, at 107 n.358.
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687
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appears to say that Congress may require states to subject themselves
to suit in exchange for participation in the many federal-state programs that are administered by states but funded by the federal gov365
ernment. Similarly, in the intellectual property arena—currently
much-debated366—College Savings Bank should imply that Congress
may condition a state’s receipt of a patent, trademark, or copyright on
the state’s agreement to be sued when it violates the patents, trademarks, or copyrights of others.367
College Savings Bank was ambiguous, however, as to whether
the problem with the implied waiver allegedly before the Court in
that case was that the waiver was merely implied and not express or
that the waiver allegedly arose from the state’s mere participation in
368
“otherwise permissible activity.” What if Congress had provided
that the state must expressly waive its sovereign immunity from suit
before engaging in the federally regulated conduct?
The answer here should turn on whether Congress could prohibit
the state from engaging in the federally regulated conduct at all. This
perspective can resolve cases such as the original Parden case. The issue of Congress’s ability to prohibit states from engaging in certain
behavior is a complex one that turns on difficult Tenth Amendment
issues. But it seems at least reasonable to suggest that Congress could
prohibit states from operating interstate railroads. Regulation of the
channels of interstate commerce is at the heart of Congress’s power
under the Commerce Clause, and Congress might, for example, con-

365. For detailed analyses supporting this view, see Bohannan, supra note 5, at 303–44; Michael T. Gibson, Congressional Authority to Induce Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity: The
Conditional Spending Power (and Beyond), 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 439 (2002); Meltzer, supra note 45, at 1375–80; Rebecca Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 199–215 (2002). For more general analyses of conditional spending that take a narrow view of Congress’s power, see generally
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (1995);
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001). Of course this point really deserves a larger treatment, but the
waivers discussed here are somewhat removed from the kinds of waivers that form the main focus of this Article.
366. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual
Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (and How Not to), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1040
(2001) (discussing methods Congress could use to provide remedies for state violations of private intellectual property rights); Meltzer, supra note 45, at 1331 (same).
367. See Gibson, supra note 365, at 503–06 (discussing the origins of intellectual property
law in relation to state sovereign immunity); Meltzer, supra note 45, at 1380–85 (proposing the
conditioning of new state intellectual property rights on waiver of state sovereign immunity).
368. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 687.
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clude that operating a railroad is a sufficiently dangerous business
that entities that are immune from suit should not be allowed to engage in it. So prohibiting state operation of interstate railroads should
be within Congress’s commerce power.
One might disagree, but the point here is really not whether one
agrees with this analysis. The point is that if Congress can prohibit
states from operating interstate railroads at all, Congress should be
able to take the lesser step of permitting states to operate interstate
railroads only if they expressly waive their immunity from suits aris369
ing out of railroad operations. If Congress can prohibit the state behavior altogether, then the behavior is no longer an “otherwise permissible activity.” Congressional permission for the state to engage in
the behavior is akin to a federal “gift or gratuity.” Accordingly, Congress should be able to condition its permission on state consent to be
sued.
A different result would probably occur, however, in connection
with other statutes that commonly lead to suits against states, such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which requires payment of the minimum wage. Again, even without getting deeply into Tenth Amendment analysis, it seems fairly safe to say that Congress could hardly
forbid states from having employees and paying them; these are “otherwise permissible activit[ies]” for which states do not require congressional permission. Congress could not, therefore, give states permission to have employees in exchange for state consent to suit based
on the minimum wage laws.
The key question in Parden-type cases should, therefore, be
whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit states from engaging in the underlying federally regulated activity at all. If it could do
so, it could compel states to request permission to engage in the activity. And if it could do that, it could set the conditions on that permission, and one such condition could be an express waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. By contrast, where Congress could not
forbid states from engaging in the underlying activity, it could not require them to consent to suit before doing so.
One might be troubled by the following potential problem with
the above analysis: although Congress probably cannot forbid states
from having employees, it can forbid states from paying their em369. To avoid a charge of special bias against the states, Congress might require all operators of interstate railroads to waive any immunity they might have from suits arising out of railroad operations.
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370
ployees less than the minimum wage. Does the above analysis therefore suggest that Congress can require that, before states pay their
employees less than the minimum wage, they consent to be sued for
doing so? The absurdity of the very question shows that the answer
has to be no. The railroad example is based on the exchange of Congress’s permission to engage in certain behavior for the state’s consent to be sued for unlawful conduct arising out of the behavior. In
the minimum wage example suggested here, Congress would not be
giving states permission to pay their employees less than the minimum wage. If Congress gave such permission, there would be nothing
to sue about. So the concept of the exchange does not work here. One
may certainly argue that the Supreme Court was wrong to hold that
Congress has power to regulate the wages states pay their employees
but not to provide state employees with any effective means of enforcing those regulations. The source of such a means, however, does
not lie in any consent by the state or waiver of state immunity; it
would have to come from some other theory of federal power.
The constructive consent cases therefore turn out to be fairly
straightforward: the critical question is whether Congress could entirely prohibit the states from engaging in a given activity. If it can, it
should be able to require the states to consent to suit expressly in exchange for permission to engage in the activity.
Once that point is agreed upon, there is but a little distance to
travel to conclude that Congress, in such cases, may likewise provide
that the state activity itself shall be deemed to constitute consent to
suit even though such consent is not given expressly. Given the Supreme Court’s current attitude toward such matters, an express consent to suit would obviously be a much sturdier ground, and one
which Congress would be well advised to employ if it desired to rely
on consent at all. But even the Supreme Court appears open to the
argument that an implicit consent will suffice in cases where Congress
could require express consent. In College Savings Bank, the Court re371
372
ferred approvingly to Petty and to South Dakota v. Dole, and it
noted that “Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions
that Congress could not require them to take, and that acceptance of

370.
371.
372.

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555–56 (1985).
Petty v. Tenn. Mo. Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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373
the funds entails an agreement to the actions.” Thus, even the Supreme Court appears to recognize that the real question is whether
Congress has the power to exact state consent to suit in exchange for
something from Congress; the precise form that the consent then
takes is a secondary consideration.

CONCLUSION
The ideologization of state sovereign immunity doctrine carried
the doctrine to extremes in many directions, including the set of rules
regarding waiver of state sovereign immunity. The post-1945 rules
created a nonsensical scheme that left the federal judicial system
helpless to prevent manifest injustice and waste of judicial resources.
A non-ideologized doctrine—even though taking the official theory
of state sovereign immunity as its starting point—would recognize
rules of waiver that would respect the state prerogative of refusing to
be sued in a federal forum while requiring states to assert that prerogative in an orderly way that shows a minimal regard for the legitimate needs of the federal judicial system.
The two critical steps necessary to rationalize the waiver cases
are, first, to revive the lost distinction between the consent line of
cases and the separate line of cases concerning waiver of state sovereign immunity, and, second, to recognize that principles of state sovereign immunity allow federal courts to give some weight to the interests of the other party in litigation against a state. Courts taking
these steps would recognize that consent is a matter of state law, but
waiver is a matter of federal law. The correct principles of federal law
show that the courts should return to the traditional rules governing
waivers of state sovereign immunity.

373. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686
(1999) (emphasis added).

